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ABSTRACT 
What would international trade law, and particularly free trade agreements 
(FTAs) of the United States, look like if the dominant paradigm for their 
negotiation, drafting, implementation and enforcement shifted from economics 
to equal human dignity? 
First, the concept of equal human dignity has deep philosophical roots, 
including in the work of Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher of the late 
Enlightenment.  The Categorical Imperative, for which Kant (among other 
insights) is renowned, and which Kant articulated in three formulations, helps 
define the concept.  Further, the American legal philosopher, John Rawls, 
offers a formula to elaborate and apply the Categorical Imperative.  Second, 
the concept also has a profound religious basis, including in Roman Catholic 
Social Justice Theory.  Third, considered in a legalistic manner, the words 
suggest specific criteria for trade accords.  “Human” intimates neutrality.  
“Equal” indicates non-discrimination.  “Dignity” suggests respect for the 
excellent.  Applying these criteria to America’s FTAs is not only possible but 
also yields specific proposals for human, labor and environmental rights that 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
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could—and perhaps should—be advanced through those FTAs.  Moreover, 
these criteria mandate a change in negotiating style. 
Following from the philosophical, religious and legalistic perspectives, 
there are three “bottom lines” in respect to a paradigm shift in United States 
FTA law and policy toward equal human dignity.  Applying Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative calls for the United States to treat its FTA partners in a 
Golden Rule-like manner.  Applying Catholic Social Justice Theory impels 
promotion of freedom of conscience as a direct effect of trade liberalization 
and possibly also the improvement of the economic milieu as indirect support 
for freedom of worship.  A legalistic approach to the words “equal,” “human” 
and “dignity” calls for incorporation into FTAs of excellent labor, 
environmental and human rights standards.  The three perspectives on equal 
human dignity are not incompatible, and the practical implications for FTAs 
are complimentary.  Yet changing the FTA paradigm to one in which equal 
human dignity predominates would require careful consideration of efficiency 
trade-offs, legal capacity, sovereign state responsibility, managed and strategic 
trade policy, and trade remedies.  The effort may well be worthwhile.  
Throughout many parts of the world, the tide favoring unrelenting and 
uncompromising free trade has turned. 
I.  A DIFFERENT PARADIGM 
Equal human dignity certainly is not the dominant paradigm in which the 
United States negotiates FTAs.  It is not even a foundational principle of 
American trade negotiating strategy.  Aside from modest references to selected 
labor and environmental matters, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2002,1 through which Congress delegated trade negotiating authority to 
the President, says nothing about equal human dignity.2 
Rather, as is clear from the congressional negotiating objectives set out in 
this Act, the ends and means of American trade policy are formulated in an 
economics crucible.  Principles like absolute advantage, comparative 
advantage, free trade and fair trade, and policies like managed trade, strategic 
trade, infant industry and rust belt manufacturer protection, and agriculture 
support, fill up most of that melting pot.  Mixed in is a large dose of national 
security.3  The predominance—dare it be said, imperialism, for better or 
 
 1. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813 (Supp. 
V 2007), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-429, 118 Stat. 2434, 2591 (2004). 
 2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801(b), 3802(a)–(c) (Supp. V 2007).  The President’s trade negotiating 
authority expired July 1, 2007 and has yet to be renewed.  See 19 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(1)(A)(ii) 
(Supp. V 2007). 
 3. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(1) (Supp. V 2007) (stating Congress’ findings that “[t]he 
expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States”) (emphasis 
added). 
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worse—of economics is as true in the context of FTAs as it is in the 
multilateral environment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO). 
But what if (a big “if” indeed) the paradigm changed, or at least more 
factors were put in the crucible?4  What if equal human dignity became a, or 
even the, cornerstone of U.S. trade policy?  What if U.S. national security was 
redefined partly in terms of promoting equal human dignity abroad through 
international trade agreements?  What would that shift, from almost 
exclusively economic motives to viewing equal human dignity as a first-order 
concern, mean in practice? 
Time and space are threshold appeals of these questions.  The interest of 
any nation in maximizing its net societal benefits from trade is long-term.  
How that interest is manifest in specific trade laws and policies, actual or 
debated, varies across time, and from one constituency in a society to another.5  
Economic equilibria shift, comparative advantages are lost in one sector and 
gained in another, and protectionist interests rise and fall.  By contrast, equal 
human dignity is enduring and universal.  Drawn from philosophy, and indeed 
from religion, it cuts across time and space. 
These questions are especially poignant now.  International trade law since 
the birth of the WTO on January 1, 1995, and entry into force of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)6 on January 1, 1994, is seen by 
many around the world not as the new frontier and champion of a better world, 
but rather as the “establishment” to be rebelled against.7  Public opinion 
 
 4. To religious leaders, of course, the “what if” question is not a “big if.” For example, 
Pope Benedict XVI spoke of the need to deal with secularism, “which presents itself in cultures 
by imposing a world and humanity without reference to Transcendence,” and which in turn 
produces a “hedonistic and consumeristic mindset,” 
by means of an appeal to the lofty values of existence that give life meaning and can 
soothe the restlessness of the human heart in search of happiness: the dignity of the 
human person and his or her freedom, equality among all men and women, the meaning 
of life and death and of what awaits us after the end of our earthly existence. 
Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the Plenary Assembly of the Pontification Council for Culture at 
the Vatican’s Clementine Hall (Mar. 8, 2008), in L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Mar. 19, 2008, at 2 
(English translation). 
 5. Denis J. Brion, Utilitarian Reasoning in Judicial Decisionmaking, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 
93, 94, 129 (1999) (arguing that ostensibly value-free utilitarian analysis (in the context of 
adjudication), rather than promoting efficiency and wealth-maximization, is “strongly normative 
in character,” and raises the specter that “our system of enterprise . . . will be a mighty engine for 
privatizing profits into the hands of the few and socializing costs onto the backs of the many”). 
 6. NAFTA is reprinted in a variety of sources. 
 7. See Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the ‘New’ International Law, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 
8–9 (1994) (advocating an insurgency to overthrow the established trade order to make way for 
better human rights protection).  In the post 9/11 world, the term “insurgency” has taken on a 
poignantly sinister connotation. 
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surveys conducted in the United States and abroad clearly indicate rising 
skepticism about globalization generally and free trade in particular.  The 
conventional paradigm of international trade accords like the WTO texts and 
NAFTA—absolute and comparative advantage—no longer command 
unequivocal bipartisan support or even support among a clear majority of the 
polity.  Of course, people worry about the impact of trade agreements on their 
own incomes, jobs and industries, but they also worry about the repercussions 
of trade liberalization on the environment, labor and product safety.8  Rising 
inequality (measured by income and non-income variables), which appears 
closely associated with (even if not definitively or directly caused by) freer 
trade, both within individual countries (e.g., China and the United States) and 
across some countries (e.g., most of sub-Saharan Africa against most of East 
Asia), is an additional source of anxiety.9  The bottom line, then, is that the 
unease with the existing high-heat, smelting, transformative process provides 
justification enough to propose equal human dignity as a new lodestar for 
American trade law and policy. 
It is premature to argue that the paradigm should (at least) integrate 
meaningfully equal human dignity with self-defined economic interests and 
champion the former over the latter.  The certainty of a new U.S. president is 
just one reason why it is too uncertain to predict that the crucible in which 
American trade law and policy are formed is likely to change.  Thus, whether 
equal human dignity ever could shape FTAs, for instance, between the United 
States and Arab countries, and thereby help shrink the commodious space 
between America and the Middle East (Israel aside), is not at issue here. 
Rather, the present purpose is to inquire theoretically and generically, 
regardless of practical realities.  What might America’s FTAs—with Arab and 
non-Arab nations alike—look like if equal human dignity was the cornerstone 
of United States policy in negotiating, drafting, implementing and enforcing 
trade agreements?  With respect to specific FTA provisions, a priori, the 
answer could be anywhere from “very much the same” to “radically different.”  
Might international agreements on human, labor and environmental rights 
serve as guidance for FTAs?  Of course, this inquiry begs a critical definitional 
question: What is “equal human dignity” anyway? 
Section II addresses the meaning of “equal human dignity.”  It examines 
international legal documents that use the term, along with insights from 
 
 8. See, e.g., Giugi Carminati, Is International Trade Really Making Developing Countries 
Dirtier and Developed Countries Richer?, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 205, 231–32 (2007) 
(concerning the controversial ramifications of trade). 
 9. See, e.g., William J. Mateikis, The Fair Track to Expanded Free Trade: Making TAA 
Benefits More Accessible to American Workers, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 78–83 (2007) 
(concerning the importance of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to address anxiety about the 
adverse effects of trade on incomes and jobs of some workers). 
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philosophers, notably Immanuel Kant and his Categorical Imperative.  Section 
II also reviews summarily the considerable body of work of theologians, 
including the 2,000 year tradition of Christian thought.  Section III briefly 
covers fields of international law in which equal human dignity has been 
considered as an evaluative benchmark.  These specialties are environmental 
law and human rights.  Drawing on the work of John Rawls, Section III also 
explores how the Categorical Imperative may be put into operation.  It also 
asks the same question of Catholic Social Justice Theory: What would an FTA 
consistent with that theory look like?  Section IV teases out from the definition 
of “equal human dignity” criteria that might be used in the context of FTAs.  
That is, Section IV identifies some of the literal implications for FTAs of the 
equal human dignity principle.  Section V then applies the legalistic criteria.  
Section VI shows how FTA negotiations and implementation might be 
conducted in an equal human dignity paradigm.  Section VII highlights 
lingering problems with that paradigm.  Concluding observations are set out in 
Section VIII. 
II.  PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DEFINITIONS OF EQUAL HUMAN DIGNITY 
A. The United Nations Charter 
The words “equal human dignity” envelop a concept not infrequently 
mentioned in public international law and used in international agreements.  
Perhaps the most renowned instance is the Preamble of the United Nations 
Charter.  The Preamble declares that the United Nations has resolved: 
[T]o reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small.10 
 
 10. The Preamble states in full: 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED 
–  to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
– to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and 
– to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
– to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
AND FOR THESE ENDS 
– to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 
and 
– to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
– to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
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However, to say the Preamble prima facie intends to connote “equal human 
dignity”—whatever that phrase means—is not readily evident.  That is because 
the Preamble deploys the three words of the phrase disconnected from one 
another.  It is the “human” person who has “dignity,” but “equality” pertains to 
the rights of men and women of big and small countries. 
Strictly and logically speaking, an element is missing.  For the language in 
the Preamble to amount to the same connotation as the term “equal human 
dignity,” it is necessary to read the phrases “of men and women” and “of 
nations large and small” as meaning the same as (or encompassing) the single 
word “human.”  Yet “human” easily is the broader term, covering children 
(implicating children’s rights, e.g., in respect of minimum working age), and 
the unborn (implicating rights of a fetus, e.g., to life and against abortion), 
whereas “of men and women” suggests humans at or past the age of maturity, 
i.e., adults.  As for “of nations large and small,” the Preamble language “equal 
rights” modifies this term, implying the equality of sovereign countries is at 
stake, distinct from the “men and women” who live in those countries. 
To be sure, it is reasonable to hold that “equal human dignity” is intended 
by the Preamble.  One piece of evidence is historical.  The United Nations 
itself was born of the hopes and fears of (inter alia) the victorious Allied 
Powers.  Surely they sought to affirm equal human dignity against the 
backdrop of a hideous loss of life in the Second World War to underscore the 
imperative of saving each person possible. 
Setting aside this modest concern about interpretative equivalence, the 
terms “equal,” “human” and “dignity” appear in several international contexts, 
typically next or proximate to the word “rights.”  Examples include the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Helsinki Accords.11  These instances, and that of 
the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, are not the product solely of legal 
minds.  Rather, thousands of years of philosophical and theological work, i.e., 
of reason and revealed truth on equality, humanity and dignity stand behind the 
appearance of the concepts in international legal instruments. 
 
– to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples, 
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS 
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city 
of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, 
have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an 
international organization to be known as the United Nations. 
U.N. Charter pmbl., available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.shtml. 
 11. For an interesting treatment of equal human dignity in public international law, see 
Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 848 (1983). 
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B. Kant and Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative 
Tracing the philosophical origin of the concept of equal human dignity 
leads to an inquiry into how humans (individually and through collective 
bodies, including governments) ought to treat one another.  Yet obviously, 
even a modest attempt at a reasonably complete discussion of what 
philosophers—not to mention theologians—have argued on the matter through 
the ages is beyond the present scope.  For now, it may be said that the origin of 
“equal human dignity,” in modern times at least, is Europe in the Age of 
Enlightenment (which ran approximately from the beginning of the 18th 
century to the Napoleonic Wars of 1804–1815), and particularly in the work of 
the late Enlightenment German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
Kant is widely touted and criticized for his philosophical theories.  
Nonetheless, viewing international law in Kantian terms is not new and indeed 
has been somewhat of a cottage industry in parts of the legal academy during 
the last few decades.  That is for good reason.  Kant himself penned an essay 
on international relations and law titled Toward Perpetual Peace, in which he 
discussed the emergence of democratic nation-states as an end to war.12  In that 
essay, originally written in 1795 and revised slightly in 1796, Kant suggested 
that international justice is not merely a function of how nation-states behave 
toward each other, but also of how they behave toward their citizens.  Put 
simply, the international legal order cannot be deemed just if the nation-states 
that constitute this order abuse individual rights.  International law must 
penetrate through the level of the nation-state and mean something for the 
individuals who comprise those states. 
How should individuals be treated?  Kant focused on the question, and 
according to him: 
Whenever human dignity is at stake, we are obliged to fight for its recognition 
and protection.  Indeed, far from being a bourgeois ideology of private 
happiness, Kantian liberalism proves to be a fighting liberalism in that it 
requires one to take on the challenges of moral self-responsibility and 
republican commitment.13 
This fight leads directly to the concept of “equal human dignity.”  In Kantian 
philosophy, the source of the concept of “equal human dignity” appears to lie 
in the Categorical Imperative “to treat every human being as an end, not as a 
 
 12. See IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 93, 113 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 2d enlarged 
ed. 1991) (1970).  For normative discussions of the essay, see generally, PERPETUAL PEACE: THE 
ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 
THE MIT Press 1997).  For a positive account of Kant, see generally Fernando R. Tesón, The 
Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992). 
 13. Heiner Bielefeldt, Autonomy and Republicanism: Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy of 
Freedom, 25 POL. THEORY 524, 525 (1997) (emphasis added). 
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means.”14  While not misleading, this oft-heard rendition of the Categorical 
Imperative is somewhat simple. 
For Kant, though, an inquiry into the supreme principle of morality (i.e., 
the Categorical Imperative) is inseparable from—even buttressed upon—the 
metaphysical limits of human knowledge.  As a result, a threshold point about 
the Categorical Imperative is that to regard a thing in itself, not as a means to 
an end, but as an end in itself, there first must be a thing to regard.15  Put 
differently, there is an implicit a priori assumption, namely, the existence of a 
thing to behold.  In response to skeptics like Reneé Descartes and David 
Hume, Kant’s need to explain the existence, or at least the reliability, of a 
physical object corresponding to a mental impression was not to be taken 
lightly.  For the present scope, such a foundational inquiry is unnecessary.  
Rather, international trade law (itself and its context) furnishes plenty of things 
to regard.  Currently, those things are economic in nature—output, trade flows 
and the like.  However, in an equal human dignity paradigm for an FTA, the 
thing to regard that indeed is available to behold is the person affected by the 
FTA.  That is, human beings are things in themselves for examination.  
Inspired by the Categorical Imperative, the question then turns to how rules in 
FTAs promote the dignity of people in countries that are parties to an FTA. 
Perhaps a more profound point concerns the above recitation of the 
Categorical Imperative.  In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), 
Kant provides three formulations of this supreme principle of morality.  Each 
of the three formulations is complementary, and each highlights a different 
feature of the Categorical Imperative—universality, humanity and autonomy.  
The first and third formulas (below) have alternatives.  The second formula 
(also below) is closest to the above recitation. 
(1) The Formula of Universal Law – 
“[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law.”16 
Alternative Formulation for the Universal Law: 
“[A]ct as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a 
universal law of nature.”17 
 
 14. See Schachter, supra note 11, at 849. 
 15. See Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 
15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 159, 183 (1997) (proposing the use of Hegel’s concept of Geist to cure 
the Kantian flaw of this a priori requirement). 
 16. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31 (Mary Gregor 
ed. and trans., Cambridge University Press 1997) (1785) (emphasis omitted). 
 17. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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The Universal Law Formula and its alternative emphasize the point of view of 
an individual (sometimes referred to as an “agent”) who wants to act morally.  
The individual seeks to know whether a proposed maxim (i.e., a subjective 
course of conduct, expressed in a sentence, put forward for consideration) is 
permissible.18  Further, the individual desires to find out whether the action 
(i.e., the specific act and, critically, the intention behind this act, in which she 
would engage to put the maxim into practice) that flows from the maxim is 
permissible.  The phrase “law of nature” (as Kant uses it) connotes a rule to 
which all persons adhere as if each person by her constitution were inclined to 
that rule.  The rule is not (or need not be) enacted by a governmental authority; 
rather, it is essentially innate in every person and, thus, more akin to natural 
law.19 
(2) The Formula of Humanity – 
“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a 
means.”20 
Whereas the Universal Law Formula highlights the perspective of the 
individual actor, the Humanity Formula considers the vantage of a person (or 
persons) affected by the action of that individual.  The question is: How is 
another human being treated when the proposed maxim is acted out in the 
world?  This question is to be addressed by paying attention to the humanity—
the moral and rational powers—of the other human being.  What is the effect 
of the act on the humanity of the other being? 
The two ways to respond to this question, or more generally, to interpret 
the Universal Law Formula, are either positively or negatively.21  Interpreted 
positively, the actor has an affirmative duty to ensure that other actors are not 
treated as merely a means to some end.  When interpreted negatively, the 
Formula requires an actor to refrain from acts that may treat others as a means 
to an end.  The respective difference can be seen, for example, in the context of 
FTAs. 
Positively, the Formula requires countries that are parties to an FTA to 
eliminate any existing conditions in which labor is exploited (e.g., through 
reforms to labor market rules).  Negatively, the Formula demands the parties 
abstain from using exploited labor (e.g., via a ban on forced and other 
 
 18. See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 926 (Am. ed. 2003) (entry 
for “maxim”).  Id. at 1199 (entry for “propose”). 
 19. See generally Thom Brooks, Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and 
Hegel on Legal Theory, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 513, 559–560 (2007) (discussing and 
differentiating natural law from various philosophical perspectives). 
 20. KANT, supra note 16, at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 21. See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 190–195 
(Barbara Herman ed., Harvard University Press 2000). 
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objectionable labor practices).  The positive and negative responses are not 
mutually exclusive.  Indeed, they may complement each other, as when an 
FTA obligates parties both to upgrade existing labor laws and noxious labor 
practices. 
(3) The Formula of Autonomy – 
“ . . . [T]he idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving 
universal law.”22 
Alternative Formulation for Autonomy: 
“[A]ct in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws 
for a merely possible kingdom of ends[.]”23 
The Autonomy Formula redirects attention back to the individual actor and 
examines moral law from her perspective.  Essentially, the Formula designates 
her as a lawmaker in a realm of being (or, as lawyers might put it, jurisdiction) 
in which each person is to be valued as an end in herself. 
The three formulations may be translated into the context of international 
trade law.  All three are about moral behavior and the formulation and 
implementation of rules that channel action to good ends.  Evaluating 
America’s FTAs in terms of whether they promote human dignity is a moral 
reflection. 
The Formula of Universal Law asks the United States to consider whether 
its trade policies, and the FTAs that follow from them, are morally acceptable.  
This inquiry—aside from pressure brought by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and other select groups on particular labor or environmental issues—
typically is not central to official thinking.  Rather, American FTA policy, 
forged in the crucible of economics, emphasizes utilitarian calculations about 
market access.  The Universal Law Formula, for instance, asks American 
officials to step outside their immediate preoccupation and imagine a world 
trading system in which officials of every country behaved the way they do. 
Manifestly, the inquiry under the Formula of Humanity is how United 
States FTA policy affects the humanity of persons in other countries that are 
parties to an FTA.  How might an FTA with Malaysia affect Bumiputras and 
the affirmative-action style preferences they have enjoyed since roughly 1970?  
How might an FTA with Qatar influence Wahhabi thinking among the 
majority Sunni population or the lot of the minority Shi’ites?  Would an FTA 
with Uruguay reinvigorate the confidence of average citizens in that country in 
the face of regional dominance by Brazil?  These kinds of questions typically 
are not part of the official calculus when America pursues an FTA (as it has 
been, in varying degrees, with Malaysia, Qatar and Uruguay).  Rather, 
 
 22. KANT, supra note 16, at 39 (emphasis omitted). 
 23. Id. at 46. 
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Malaysians, Qataris and Uruguayans are a means to an end.  They are (1) 
customers of American exporters of goods and services and (2) suppliers of 
inputs and products to American consumers.  The end they serve is the 
promotion of America’s economic well-being (and, if they negotiate FTA 
terms and conditions astutely, their own).  But advancing their humanity and 
moral and rational agency, while not presumptively excluded by an FTA, is not 
the primary aim of the trade deal. 
The Formula of Autonomy puts the United States in the role it effectively 
plays in most FTA negotiations.  The United States is the lawmaker, with more 
or less give-and-take depending on the legal sophistication of trade officials 
from the country with which it is negotiating.  Suppose the kingdom of ends—
the world trading system—was one in which each individual, regardless of 
citizenship, was valued as an end in herself.  How would the United States 
behave in the negotiations?  Would it call for immediate, unconditional market 
access in all goods and services sectors?  In its aggressive pursuit of free trade, 
would the United States be motivated by the interests of individuals in other 
countries?  Would treating Americans as ends in themselves mean the United 
States accepts the converse, instantaneous, duty-free and quota-free access 
(DF/QF) to all American markets by foreign producers and exporters? 
C. Five Steps in Catholic Social Justice Theory24 
Philosophy is not alone in appreciating that in any economic endeavor in 
which a society engages, one moral problem that arises concerns the 
appropriate relationship of the individual to a society.  Religions also 
appreciate the gravity of the issue.25  For instance, Catholic Social Justice 
Theory proposes a clear resolution: champion human dignity.  Individuals 
 
 24. This section draws from RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
420–426 (2003).  For a discussion of equal human dignity in relation to the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and in particular whether that Declaration is coherent and rests on 
a genuinely universal approach to dignity, or is essentially an instrument of western cultural 
imperialism, see Mary Ann Glendon, International Law: Foundations of Human Rights—The 
Unfinished Business, in REDISCOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS—CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 319–20 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007). 
 25. Of the world’s approximately 6.5 billion people, and rounding figures, 33% (2.1 billion) 
are Christian (17.4% Catholic, and 15.6% Protestant), 21% (1.5 billion) are Muslim (split 
approximately 80 to 20% between Sunni and Shi’ia), 14% (900 million) are Hindu, 6% (376 
million) are Buddhist, 0.36% (23 million) are Sikh, and 0.22% (14 million) are Jewish.  Non-
religious persons (covering agnosticism, atheism, and secular humanism) account for 16% (1.1 
billion) of the world’s population.  A variety of religions (e.g., Chinese traditional, Baha’i, 
Jainism, Shinto and Zoroastrianism) are adhered to by the remainder of the world’s people.  See 
World has More Muslims than Catholics, SBS WORLD NEWS HEADLINE STORIES, Mar. 31, 2008, 
available at FACTIVA, doc. SBSWNH0020080330e43v0005y; Adherents.com, Major Religions 
of the World Ranked by Number of Adherents, http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_ 
Adherents.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). 
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ought to relate to one another, either directly or through social groupings and 
constructs, in a manner that promotes the worth of each individual from natural 
conception to natural death.  Negotiating, drafting, implementing and 
enforcing an FTA is just one of many economic endeavors in which American 
society, partly through its elected and appointed officials, is engaged.  The 
Theory then would call for the FTA endeavor to respect human dignity.  But 
what does this Theory mean by “human dignity” and “respect” for it?26 
The answer is revealed through five steps.  Free will is the first step.  
Respect for human dignity, and as a corollary, the promotion of equality of the 
human person, is a logical extension of the Catholic precept that the dignity of 
a human being lies in her ability to discern freely good from evil. 
[M]an is given [by God] intelligence and free will so that he can choose the 
good, the good made known through the objective law of God.  For those who 
do not know the one true God, this good is known through the natural law.  For 
those who do know God, the good is known by Revelation and the Church 
which interprets it.27 
Of course, to opt for good over evil presumes each person enjoys the requisite 
political and economic freedom to exercise this choice. 
Freedom to organize into groupings, then, is the next step toward 
respecting human dignity and promoting equality.  Individuals must be free to 
organize themselves into such groups in the first place.  In turn, when people 
organize themselves into a society—be it civic, political or economic in 
nature—that society must respect the dignity of each constituent individual.28  
As Pope John XXIII explains in his 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris: 
 
 26. Professor Glendon recounts a distinction in Christian teaching in the meaning of the term 
“dignity of the human person,” namely, (1) an attribute given by God, versus (2) an achievement 
or goal to be realized gradually over time through strenuous effort to overcome sin.  Professor 
Glendon points out the second connotation implies not every human being is entitled to human 
rights—only those individuals who have strived to practice virtue.  She also provides the 
Christian rebuttal, namely, that the duty incumbent upon each person to perfect his or her own 
dignity obliges that person to respect the God-given spark of dignity in all other persons, whether 
or not those other persons have similarly strived to reform themselves.  See Glendon, supra note 
24, at 331.  For present purposes, no position is taken on the distinction between dignity as a 
given characteristic and dignity as a quality to be realized.  However, the aforementioned rebuttal 
of the implication from the second connotation is accepted as a premise here, i.e., all are entitled 
to equal human dignity, and its promotion through FTAs is a question of both theoretical and 
practical importance. 
 27. RODGER CHARLES, S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 29 (1999). 
 28. Id. at 61 (stating “[t]he structures and mechanisms of economic society must respect the 
dignity of the man who works, and his spiritual, moral and intellectual needs as well as his 
material needs”). 
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Men have the right to form associations and give them the form which they 
consider most suitable for their objectives.  Such organizations safeguard 
man’s personal freedom and dignity.29 
The declarative tone and language are not too strong in the context of 
international trade law.  Individuals form a society to serve their interests and 
the common good, such as negotiating collectively a trade agreement with 
another societynot the other way around.  They submit to the authority of a 
society insofar as the society operates, including through its FTAs, to their 
benefit.  Trade agreements are social constructs meant to serve people for their 
mutual benefit.  People are not supposed to be slaves to FTAs imposed on 
them. 
Here, then, is the third step.  The dignity of each human being is not a gift 
from the society of which she is a part.  It is not a legal right or a customary 
privilege flowing from the society to the individual.  Respect for human 
dignity is not justified by sentimentality (i.e., that it is “nice” to do so) or by 
secular democratic theory (which champions individual rights).  Thus, that 
dignity is not rightly available for a society to withdraw or curtail by law 
(including an international agreement like an FTA), extra-legal means (e.g., the 
use of force) or any other measures. 
Rather, that dignity is a consequence of being made in the image of God.  
It is innate in every human being, and it is put there by God.  In effect, dignity 
is a gift from the common Creator of all persons.  The reason is human beings 
are “made in God’s image and likeness.”30  Pope Leo XIII put the point 
forcefully in the 1891 encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which heralded modern 
Catholic Social Justice Theory by responding to the challenges of free-
wheeling capitalism: 
All men have the same Father who is God the Creator, the same benefits of 
nature and gifts of divine grace belong in common to the whole human race: 
“we are children, we are heirs as well; heirs of God and co-heirs with 
Christ.”31 
In brief, the arrow of causation starts with God, who makes us.  What is 
more, God makes us in a particular way.  Namely, each person is unique, 
unrepeatable and of inestimable value.  By respecting the true origin of all 
persons and these three attributes of each person, we respect God. 
To explain the third step another way, respect for human dignity is an 
inalienable right conferred by God on each human in a special, one-time and 
priceless manner.  Failure of a society to respect this dignity is a key indicator 
 
 29. Id. at 34 (citing POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, PACEM IN TERRIS [Peace on 
Earth] ¶¶ 23–24 (Apr. 27, 1963)). 
 30. Id. at 29. 
 31. Id. at 34 (citing POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, RERUM NOVARUM [On the 
Condition of the Working Classes] ¶ 24 (May 15, 1891)). 
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the society has become oppressive.  Political and economic societies are 
particularly susceptible to this vice.  In turn, oppression is a legitimate reason 
for individuals to cease with their responsibilities toward the society, to rescind 
their fidelity to that society, and in serious instances, to revolt against the 
society.32  Even if unintended, oppression can occur in the name of trade 
liberalization or by operation of international trade agreements. 
The fourth step to understanding what “equal human dignity” means, in the 
light of Catholic Social Justice Theory, is to appreciate what is truly at stake.  
There is more to the rationale that individuals must be free to associate than a 
social contract-type bargain between individuals and society.  Catholic Social 
Justice Theory teaches that the stakes are as high as ever could be imagined—
the eternal destiny of each human being in a society.  If an individual is unduly 
constrained by, for example, international trade agreements, then he cannot 
exercise his free will to choose whether to embark on a path in contemplation 
of the after-life or which path to choose.  Why not?  Simply because he is not 
free to choose right from wrong, and thus cannot work toward a spiritual end. 
[M]an is born into freedom and for freedom.  Made in God’s image and 
likeness, he must be able to obey God’s law in freedom.  In this way he can be 
happy in this life and, when life is over, receive the reward of eternal life.  He 
must therefore have political and economic freedom, because only through 
them can he make the free choices in his life which will enable him to serve 
God worthily.33 
Put succinctly, “[m]an is the purpose and end of every society, and the State 
(and any social organisation) exists to serve him.  He does not exist to serve 
them.”34 
Applied to FTAs, the point is they should operate to liberate each affected 
person not only for appropriate material pursuits in this life, but also to 
support, or at least not to obstruct, the spiritual quest of each person toward the 
afterlife.  (To be sure, whether a particular individual takes up that quest is 
another matter.)  When an FTA achieves both aims, it respects the dignity of 
the human person.  Lest this linkage seem tenuous, or even laughable, consider 
the general observation of Father Massaro: 
  [T]he Catholic view of human rights is distinctive because it is grounded 
on a complete theological framework, in which God is the ultimate source of 
our rights. . . .  In comparison, purely secular doctrines of rights have no 
similar foundation in a compelling portrayal of human nature and its origin.  In 
a sense, they are doctrines without a solid theory behind them.  They are 
 
 32. See CHARLES, supra note 27, at 14. 
 33. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
 34. Id. at 13.  See also id. at 35 (stating “[t]hat the citizen has rights which the state cannot 
take away from him, and that man is the end and purpose of every social organisation, are 
principles which a healthy civil society must foster”). 
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exposed to the weighty charge that rights just seem to “float around,” sticking 
to people without any justification behind their passing claims.  (Emphasis 
added).35 
To be sure, scholars not inclined to argumentation based on revealed truth 
would take issue (and indeed have done so) with the suggestion that secular 
doctrines of human dignity, derived solely from human reason, lack heft.  
Some of them would (and do) cast the same charge back at religion-based 
doctrines.  This debate is beyond the present scope.  For now, suffice it to say 
that perhaps neither side has to fear authentic, genuine argumentation of the 
other insofar as faith and reason are complementary, and truth (derived from 
one source) does not contradict truth (derived from the other source). 
The fifth and final step concerns “equality.”  If human dignity is to be 
respected for the aforementioned reasons, then does it follow that the dignity of 
each human person should be respected equally?  After all, if each person is 
unique, unrepeatable and of inestimable worth, then why not attempt to make 
reasonable gradations among individuals?  At least three rationales strongly 
favor equal treatment.  First, consider the First Commandment.  It is for God to 
make judgments among persons.  To put oneself on par with God is 
intrinsically sinful. 
Second, all persons share a common Creator.  The differences are not 
borne of different gods creating different people—it is not that Ra made 
Egyptians, Zeus made Greeks, and Jupiter made Romans.  A key implication 
of monotheism contends that differences among people pale in significance to 
the spark of a single Divine power in each person.  Indeed, a verse from the 
Holy Qur’an explains: 
Believers, no one group of men should jeer at another, who may after all be 
better than them; no one group of women should jeer at another, who may after 
all be better than them; do not speak ill of one another; do not use offensive 
nicknames for one another.  How bad it is to be called a mischief-maker [i.e., 
one who engages in any of the aforementioned behaviors] after accepting faith!  
Those who do not repent of this behavior are evildoers. . . .  So be mindful of 
God: God is ever relenting, most merciful.  People, We [i.e., God (Allah)] 
created you all from a single man and a single woman, and made you into 
races and tribes so that you should recognize one another.  In God’s eyes, the 
most honoured of you are the ones most mindful of Him: God is all knowing, 
all aware.36 
In other words, God created differences among people for a counter-
intuitive reason: they interact with each other, thereby develop an 
 
 35. THOMAS MASSARO, S.J., LIVING JUSTICE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING IN ACTION 118 
(2000). 
 36. THE QUR’AN, The Private Rooms 49:11–13 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., Oxford 
University Press 2004). 
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understanding of their respective national, ethnic or other backgrounds, and in 
turn—most importantly—realize their common origin. 
Third, recount the consequences of denying the equal dignity of each 
individual.  To categorize individuals along ethnic, disability, gender, 
linguistic, racial or religious lines is to begin down the slippery slope of 
dehumanizing certain groups—rejecting the very humanity of individuals in 
those groups.  The results conjure up some of the worst episodes in human 
history. 
III.  IMPLEMENTING PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DEFINITIONS OF EQUAL 
HUMAN DIGNITY 
A. Practicing the Categorical Imperative in Other Areas of International 
Law 
Traditionally, international trade law, and international business law 
generally, have been segregated (with much of the inequality segregation 
implies) from public international law (aside from obvious areas of overlap, 
such as treaty interpretation) and have not discussed equal human dignity as a 
top priority.  Perception may be the reason; namely, a sense that trade often is 
antithetical to the advancement of human dignity.37  A key goal of public 
international law, from a Kantian outlook, is to protect human rights by 
providing a structure for international justice and thereby protect human 
dignity.38  In contrast, the goal for international trade is to engage in 
transactions that provide a just economic regime, where parties can maximize 
the efficiency of preference satisfaction, focusing on what they will get from 
the transaction, not what they are necessarily doing to the other in the 
transaction.39 
Surely, as the common feeling goes, the two global regimes are bifurcated 
in their attributes and share little, if any, common ground.  One regime is about 
human rights and veers toward absolutism in their promotion.  The other 
regime is about economic consequentialism and demands rational self-
interested calculations.  Equal human dignity fits as a paradigm far better in the 
first regime than the second, making public international law matters more 
easily susceptible to an equal human dignity analysis than international trade 
rules.  There is an incongruity, just as there would be if the evaluative 
paradigm for a basketball player were baseball metrics like earned run average 
(ERA), on base percentage (OBP) or slugging percentage (SLG). 
 
 37. See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human 
Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 51, 63–64 (1999). 
 38. See id. at 69–73. 
 39. See id. at 64–69. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
26 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:9 
If taken too closely to heart, however, this common feeling can petrify into 
conventional wisdom and paralyze exploration of possible new paradigms, 
crucibles and frameworks.  Perhaps equal human dignity, as inspired by Kant’s 
work, can reveal something meaningful and different about the way in which 
America negotiates, drafts and implements its FTAs with Arab countries.  
Accordingly, while by no means a comprehensive review of Perpetual Peace or 
the Categorical Imperative, or even a survey of the commendable efforts of 
legal scholars to apply Kantian philosophy to international legal problems 
(public or private) is possible, the effort here is to see what might be gleaned 
from this body of primary and secondary work with a view to building a viable 
model of equal human dignity with which to examine FTAs.40 
Interestingly, applying Kantian concepts to trade issues often concentrates 
on the ethics of international corporate behavior.  Condemnation of the 
diamond trade in Africa and Holocaust survivor claims against the European 
finance industry from the Second World War are examples of international 
corporate responsibility in the arena of international business.41  Corporations 
are wont to dwell on maximizing their own self-defined interests and not 
internalize the costs of their actions on the communities, or broader world, 
around them.  Many of them boast a pseudo-state level of power, and their 
actions can heavily impact the economic, political and social conditions of a 
country in which they operate.  All the more reason, then, for ethics 
intervention.42 
However, the two most common international legal arenas in which equal 
human dignity, sometimes with explicit references to Kant’s work, play a 
larger and sometimes center-stage role, are human rights law and 
environmental law.  Indeed, recent scholarship highlights the importance of 
equal human dignity in the realm of public international law generally, and that 
point was underscored in the address of the Holy Father, Pope Benedict XVI, 
to the United Nations General Assembly on April 18, 2008.43  The role of 
 
 40. See generally Frank J. Garcia, Book Reviews and Notes, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 733, 746–749 
(1999) (reviewing FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Westview 
Press 1998) and (discussing “‘the Kantian thesis’—namely, that the normative status of the 
individual is at the center of international law” and its implications for international legal theory); 
Harry D. Gould, Toward a Kantian International Law, 5 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 31–56 (1999) 
(featuring a paper titled “Toward a Kantian Theory of International Law,” with several replies). 
 41. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 446–47 (2001) (citing these examples among others as a 
victory for human rights activists over private corporations). 
 42. See id. at 497–98, 503. 
 43. See PATRICK M. CAPPS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Hart Publishing 2007).  His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Members of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (Apr. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe 
_20080418_un-visit_en.html. 
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equal human dignity in other spheres of the international legal order 
illuminates possibilities for international trade law. 
To begin, it seems odd that equal human dignity would not be part of the 
core analytical framework of human rights law.  Indeed, whenever that 
omission does occur, it seems a glaring one.  The application of Kantian theory 
to human rights practice is an obvious one, given the emphasis in Kant’s work 
on the treatment of individuals.  The promotion of labor rights (closely allied 
with, if not a subset of, human rights) is seen in some quarters as antithetical to 
trade.  Enhanced worker treatment (e.g., raising wage rates and the minimum 
age for employment) and protection (e.g., ensuring the right to associate, 
organize and bargain collectively) potentially erodes the comparative 
advantage that derives from essentially exploitative conditions.44  (The obvious 
response, on non-Kantian, utilitarian economic grounds, is that happy, healthy 
workers are more productive than downtrodden ones.  Thus, the wage rate of a 
worker is (or ought to be) linked to marginal revenue product of that worker, 
and productivity gains are a critical source of economic growth and 
competitiveness.)  From a perspective inspired by the Categorical Imperative, 
however, market forces and merit-based decisions can be great levelers of the 
global competitive playing field, and through respect for human dignity in the 
marketplace, individual liberty can be maximized and made more equal across 
countries.45  Rules governing international commercial intercourse, then, can 
advance human rights if they are properly crafted with equal human dignity in 
mind. 
As for environmental law, Kant’s Categorical Imperative has been applied 
to the nexus between the physical environment (natural resources) and trade.  It 
is argued that environmental standards would be accorded far greater weight 
relative to trade liberalization if a Categorical Imperative standard were 
imposed on environmentally risky trade behavior.46  Moreover, environmental 
law itself would occupy even more time and energy of international lawyers 
and diplomats, and environmental treaties would be more readily and 
 
 44. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Linking Trade and Labor Standards: Prioritizing the Right of 
Association, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 641, 645–646 (2006) (arguing in favor of an international 
collective bargaining process to counterbalance the effect of transnational corporations). 
 45. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of 
International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 434–435 (2003) (advocating a strong 
constitution to create a marketplace in which human rights are protected). 
 46. See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1373, 1376–1381 (1992) (comparing a John Stuart Mills-style analysis to a 
Kantian examination of the impact of the Tuna/Dolphin GATT panel decisions and advocating a 
paradigm where trade advances the human condition). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
28 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:9 
aggressively enforceable and enforced, if that Imperative were the principle 
governing the environment-trade nexus.47 
Notably, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) on Cultural 
Diversity has looked at cultural (as distinct from physical) environmental 
protection.  The UNEP interprets equal human dignity as regard for the 
diversity of the world and protection of cultural heritage.48  In its view, 
globalization threatens this diversity and thereby undermines equal human 
dignity.  In turn, trade, because it promotes or leads to a globalized world, is a 
causal variable.49  It is not globalization per se.  After all, a more closely 
connected, inter-linked world is an environment in which cultures can learn 
more about one another and (thinking optimistically) develop admiration and 
respect, or at least tolerance, for each other.  Rather, it is the centralization of 
power in a few countries and corporations, and in their political and economic 
elites associated with globalization that leads to the dominance of one or a few 
cultures.  In respect to trade, it is the dominance of goods and services from 
one or a few countries and corporations in the marketplaces of so many other 
countries that threatens to wipe out diversity of the cultural environment.50 
B. The Rawlsian Algorithm for the Categorical Imperative 
John Rawls suggests a four-step methodology for applying the Categorical 
Imperative to practical situations: 
 Proposal of an individual maxim; 
 Generalization of the individual maxim into a universal precept; 
 Transformation of the universal precept into universal law; and 
 Imagining the world as adjusted by operation of the universal law. 51 
The first step is the most difficult because it builds on Kant’s nebulous 
definition of a “maxim.”  Thereafter, the steps follow rather logically. 
Kant defines a maxim in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) 
as the “subjective principle of volition.”52  This definition reflects an 
 
 47. See generally Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: 
Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 1131 (2006) (calling for more robust sanctions for international environmental violations). 
 48. See Governing Council of the United Nation Environment Programme, Summary Report 
of the High-Level Roundtable on Cultural Diversity and Biodiversity for Sustainable 
Development, UNEP/GC.22/INF/16 (Dec. 20, 2002) (focusing especially on comments from Mr. 
Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director of UNEP). 
 49. See id. (focusing especially on comments from Mr. Jacques Chirac, former President of 
France and Dr. Massoumeh Ebtekar, Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of 
the Department of the Environment). 
 50. See id. (focusing especially on comments from Mr. Juan Mayr, former Minister of the 
Environment for Colombia). 
 51. See RAWLS, supra note 21, at 167–70. 
 52. KANT, supra note 16, at 14. 
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ontological claim (i.e., an assertion about the nature of being) Kant initially 
made in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781).  That claim 
holds the only way an individual knows the world is through her unique 
perspectives of experience.  This contention bespeaks the Copernican 
Revolution Kant hoped to bring to philosophy, specifically through 
metaphysics (the theoretical inquiry into being and knowing).  Consequently, 
the bedrock of human understanding starts—indeed, must commence—from 
the subjective mind of the individual.  In Groundwork, Kant urges that the 
initial point for any moral evaluation is for the individual making the 
evaluation to act in response to the situation the individual is evaluating in a 
way that produces a more desirable state of affairs.  Rawls describes this 
evaluation as follows: 
I [the individual moral evaluator] am to do X in circumstances C in order to 
bring about Y unless Z.  (Here, X is an action and Y is an end, a state of 
affairs.)53 
In effect, moral evaluation begins with an individual inquiry into how to 
improve, via a voluntary act of the free will, X, the status quo, C, which will 
lead to Y.  (It is assumed implicitly that X is not physically impossible to 
perform.) The end, Y, is chosen over all other outcomes, except for Z.  This 
preference is the proposal of an individual maxim by the individual moral 
evaluator. 
In the second step, the individual maxim is generalized to a universal 
precept, i.e., a moral rule of conduct that applies to everyone.  In effect, the 
pronoun “I” in the above quote becomes “We,” meaning all persons.  Rawls re-
writes the moral statement as follows: 
Everyone is to do X in circumstance C in order to bring about Y unless Z.54 
The act X not only must be physically possible to do, but it also must be 
generalizable.  This requirement is not an easy one to satisfy, though various 
means for doing so have been proposed.  One suggestion is an act can be 
generalized only if it passes the “Practical Contradiction Interpretation.”55  
How would the world be if everyone engaged in the act, X?  This question is 
the essence of the Test. 
Suppose an individual cannot act in accordance with X.  The Test is failed, 
as the act is impossible.  Suppose an individual can perform X but cannot 
 
 53. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 168. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 77–78 (Cambridge University Press, 1996).  Professor Korsgaard offers three 
possibilities, adopting the one discussed above.  The Logical Contradiction Interpretation 
considers whether a maxim is inconceivable when universalized.  The Teleological Contradiction 
Interpretation considers whether, when a maxim is universalized, it “is inconsistent with a 
systematic harmony of purposes.”  Id. at 78. 
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achieve the desired goal, Y.  Again, the Test is failed because the act is not 
efficacious.  By way of example, suppose the maxim is that everyone in similar 
circumstances, C, is allowed to make a false promise in order to obtain a loan, 
Y.56  Imagine a world in which every similarly situated person makes a false 
promise to a prospective lender.  The act would lose its appeal, and the 
unappealing act would lose its efficacy.  That is, if everyone makes a false 
promise to secure a loan, then the act of promising becomes unattractive, and 
that act is ineffectual in securing the loan.  In brief, X (false promise) fails to 
bring about Y (loan disbursement), hence X contradicts Y—the Test is failed. 
Assuming that a universal precept is agreed upon that passes the Practical 
Contradiction Interpretation, the third step in the Rawlsian algorithm is joined.  
The universal precept is transformed into a universal law.  The individual 
moral evaluator asks whether she could will the perturbed social world.  The 
perturbed social world is the world that would result if the generalized maxim 
were implemented as a law of nature.  (“Perturbed” here means changed, with 
no necessary pejorative connotation.)  Unfortunately, Kant does not clearly 
answer how an individual gives content to this will.  Rawls indicates that the 
individual cannot apply her own personal preferences, desires or interests to 
make this determination.  He offers two sensible reasons.  First, the individual 
might have evil preferences.  Second, an individual must regard herself as 
having an end she could share with all other human beings.  If the individual 
could not share such an end, it could not possibly satisfy the Formula of 
Autonomy. 
Rawls helpfully explains this content-giving step by analogizing to the 
legislative intent of a one-person moral congress.57  The subjective maxim that 
started this process determines the scope of the inquiry by intending to bring 
about a certain state of affairs.  That state of affairs may pass the Practical 
Contradiction Test, but it fails the third step “if [the moral actor] cannot at the 
same time both will this [perturbed] social world and intend to act from that 
maxim as a member of it.”58  Rawls thus recasts the moral statement, 
aggregating the first three steps, as follows: 
  Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y, as if 
by a law of nature (as if such a law was implanted in us by natural instinct).59 
Notably, Rawls characterizes the universal law established in this third step as 
a “law of nature” (or “as-if law of nature” because it is not actually in force).60 
 
 56. KANT, supra note 16, at 15. 
 57. See RAWLS, supra note 21, at 169. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 168. 
 60. Id. at 168–69.  The Rawlsian aggregation quoted above raises a question, namely, from 
which point of view should an individual assess whether she can will this perturbed social world?  
See generally HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (Hackett Publishing 1981) (1907). 
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The introduction by Rawls of Natural Law to the moral evaluation may, on 
a personal level, reflect the interest this great philosopher had in a Christian 
seminary.  In fact, Rawls had planned on enrolling in divinity school after 
completing his undergraduate degree at Princeton.61  Instead, he enlisted in the 
armed services and fought in the Second World War.62  After completing his 
tour of duty, but grappling with dramatic challenges the war posed to his 
religious beliefs, he chose to forego divinity school and study philosophy.63  
Nevertheless, it seems his early interest continued to influence his work and at 
least may suggest the complementarity of philosophical and religious 
approaches to equal human dignity and FTAs. 
Intellectually, the recourse to Natural Law provides a bridge to the 
religious explanation for equal human dignity (discussed in Section III.C, 
infra).  Natural Law, of course, refers to principles, including moral 
distinctions between right and wrong, that an individual can discern through 
the use of reason.  These principles are natural to the individual.  From a 
religious perspective, the principles are impressed into the nature of each 
individual by our common Creator.  Natural legal principles thus are consistent 
with authentically true religious precepts. 
The fourth and final step of the Rawlsian algorithm is to envision the new 
world.  What does the adjusted social world look like after the universal law 
has taken hold in it and its repercussions filtered through it?  Rawls explains 
this imagination test as follows: 
We are to adjoin the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the existing laws of nature 
(as these are understood by us) and then think through as best we can what the 
order of nature would be once the effects of the newly adjoined law of nature 
have had sufficient time to work themselves out.64 
In effect, the fourth step is not a literal application and post hoc examination of 
the effects of the universal law.  Rather, it is a rough guide to test the law in an 
a priori sense before actually applying it. 
How might Rawls’s algorithm help in applying Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative to United States FTA policy?  Consider each step in the context of 
that policy.  The “individual” is the United States, and the other individuals—
everyone else—are the other trading nations of the world.  Step one would be 
the formulation of an individual maxim by the United States.  That maximum 
would be something like this: 
The United States is to relegate free trade as its top priority in international 
trade law, whenever it negotiates, drafts, implements or enforces an FTA (the 
 
 61. SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 8 (Brian Leiter ed., Routledge 2007). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 169. 
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circumstance, C), so as to advance equal human dignity (the act, X) through 
each FTA as the top priority, unless free trade itself would bring about an 
advancement in human dignity. 
In step two, this individual American maxim would be generalized to a 
universal precept.  Therefore, promoting equal human dignity would become 
the preeminent goal of every country, and the action of each country would be 
to subordinate all other goals, particularly free trade. 
Every country is to relegate free trade as its top priority in international trade 
law, whenever it negotiates, drafts, implements, or enforces an FTA (the 
circumstance, C), so as to advance equal human dignity (the act, X) through 
each FTA as the top priority, unless free trade itself would bring about an 
advancement in human dignity. 
Of course, transforming the individual maxim to a universal one must pass a 
two-pronged Practical Contradiction Test. 
First, each country must be capable of making the trade policy shift.  
Precisely how each country would alter its trade policy depends on its own 
constitutional and governmental structure.  In the United States, Congress 
would make the change because the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
(Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) imparts to the legislative branch the power to 
regulate foreign trade.  More serious is the question of whether each country 
could make the shift.  There are roughly 350 FTAs in the world, meaning there 
are more of them than countries (192).  Among the 152 WTO members, only 
Mongolia is not a party to an FTA.  What are countries to do about their 
existing FTAs, which do not necessarily or explicitly champion equal human 
dignity over free trade?  Are they to renegotiate them entirely or merely amend 
them to add an “equal human dignity override clause”? 
The solution possibly lies in the desire to make the maxim universal.  If 
every country is to make the policy change, then it ought to be non-
problematical for each country.  Yet that begs a question many countries—
especially ones with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes—may ask: What does 
“equal human dignity” mean?  If a country does not like the definition, then it 
will claim impossibility as a defense in making the policy shift.  The 
discussion in Section IV, infra, proposes a legalistic definition.  Whether every 
country would agree to it or interpret it in the same manner is dubious. 
Second, the policy shift by each country must work.  It must advance, not 
undermine, the equality of each human person.  Nor may it leave different 
persons in the same state of inequality they find themselves in already.  This 
second prong of the Test raises an epistemological question: How is the world 
trade community to know whether the shift worked?  There also is a potentially 
significant problem in respect of the multilateral trading system.  Suppose 
countries are successful in promoting equal human dignity through FTAs, but 
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GATT-WTO agreements, both present and future, undermine or leave 
untouched that dignity. 
In Step three of the Rawlsian algorithm, the universal precept becomes a 
universal law.  Accordingly, in the FTA context: 
Every country always relegates free trade as its top priority in international 
trade law, whenever it negotiates, drafts, implements or enforces an FTA (the 
circumstance, C), so as to advance equal human dignity (the act, X) through 
each FTA as the top priority, as if by a law of nature. 
That law of nature is trade should be voluntary and mutually beneficial at a 
human level, not just at an aggregated national level. 
Finally, what would the world trading system look like if the proposed 
universal law were adopted and practiced by every country?  Following 
implementation of equal human dignity—not market access—as the key goal 
of an FTA, would the dignity of individuals in countries that are parties to an 
FTA be better respected than before? 
C. Applying Catholic Social Justice Theory65 
In proclaiming respect for equal human dignity as an inviolable human 
right sourced in a common Creator, Catholic Social Justice Theory proposes a 
connection between that respect on the one hand and human rights on the other 
hand.  Theologians agree that such a connection exists: 
Law, morality, justice, the common good and human rights are inter-linked in 
the Christian understanding of things.  The purpose of the law is to give 
justice, to see that each gets what is his due; we know what is just because the 
moral law of God instructs us.  The common good means the good of each and 
the good of all.  And we can see that good is being achieved when all have 
their human rights.  These too are founded in God’s law; being made in God’s 
image and likeness; all men must be treated according to that dignity.66 
Respect for equal human dignity necessarily means the promotion of human 
rights because they derive from that dignity, which in turn is divine in origin 
and nature.67  Upon what, specifically, are those rights founded other than the 
precept (or, dare it be said, axiom) of respect for human dignity?  In sum, from 
a religious perspective, the dignity of the human person is to be respected 
 
 65. This section draws from RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 642–643 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3d ed. 
2008). 
 66. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 45–46.  See also DAVID BOHR, CATHOLIC MORAL 
TRADITION 324 (Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division rev’d ed. 1999) (observing “Pope Leo 
XIII rooted his social ethics in the supreme value of the human person,” and “[a]ll political and 
social structures need to respect and respond to this primary moral claim of human dignity”) 
(emphasis added). 
 67. See CHARLES, supra note 27, at 29. 
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because of the common Creator of each individual, the likeness according to 
which each individual is made, and the invitation to each individual to live in 
this world with a view to the world that is to come. 
Turning to the practical, what does this kind of religious approach to equal 
human dignity mean for FTAs, particularly ones pursued by the United States?  
One possibility is that human rights should play a more central role in FTAs 
than they generally do.  Perhaps through its FTAs, the United States ought to 
explicitly commit itself and fellow members to advancing human rights 
through peaceful commercial intercourse and clearly set out the proposition 
that the ultimate aim of the FTA is not merely to liberalize trade to realize 
efficiency gains but also to realize “humanity” gains. 
An obvious difficulty this proposition raises is deciding which particular 
human rights matter.  Surely an FTA ought not be redundant with a human 
rights convention.  Are there particular human rights on which an FTA ought 
to focus, perhaps because they can be most easily connected to and advanced 
by trade?  To address this difficulty and thereby focus on certain rights, it may 
be helpful to recall the admittedly debatable normative paradigm shift outlined 
in Section I, supra.  The key purpose of trade liberalization through an FTA 
ought to be the enhancement of equal human dignity, which from a religious 
perspective should mean improved economic standards of living so as to create 
enlarged spaces for individuals to realize their full spiritual potential. 
In the conventional economic paradigm, net social wealth maximization—
occasionally with a few noises about income distribution—is seen as the goal 
of international trade liberalization.  However, from a religious perspective, 
accumulation of wealth, even with more just income distribution, ought not to 
be an end in itself of trade or any other economic endeavor.  A person does not 
exist for work.  Work exists for a person to draw on her God-given abilities, 
grow physically, intellectually, emotionally and culturally, and serve the 
communities in which she is a part.  Through that growth and service, she has 
the opportunity to develop as a spiritual being, to draw nearer to the Divine 
source whence she came and to which she might hope to return.  In this 
personal encounter, she may come to realize her common bond with the rest of 
the human family.  Put in overtly Catholic terms, work ought to be a forum in 
which the human person is invited to a deep, enduring peace with God and his 
neighbor, thus practicing the two Great Commandments.68 
Whether a particular individual accepts this invitation depends from one to 
another.  Acceptance of the offer cannot (and ought not) be imposed by any 
external force.  But trade liberalization should not cut off or impinge on this 
 
 68. See UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2055 at 499 (United States Catholic Conference 2d ed. 
1997) (quoting the two Great Commandments from Matthew 22:37–40, and discussing them in 
relation to the Ten Commandments). 
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opportunity.  Removing burdens or restrictions on international commerce 
through an FTA, only to burden or restrict the ability of each human to 
exercise freedom of conscience, is a short-term and Faustian pact.  In brief, the 
proposition is whether an FTA liberalizes trade in a manner that invites all 
affected individuals to develop, each at her own pace and in her chosen way, in 
the image and likeness of their common Creator. 
To assess whether an FTA does so, it is useful to distinguish between 
direct and indirect effects that a trade liberalizing agreement can have on the 
opportunity of individuals in FTA countries to realize (again, should they 
choose to make the effort) their full spiritual potential.  The direct effect, most 
obviously, is an FTA that explicitly obligates the member countries to remove 
impediments to freedom of worship.  Lest there be doubt that trade 
liberalization can promote religious freedom, consider what happened in 
Vietnam following its accession to the WTO. 
In September 2007, the Vietnamese government permitted Stella Maris 
Major Seminary, the third major Catholic seminary in the country, to recruit an 
unrestricted number of candidates.  Vietnam has six total seminaries and 
twenty-six dioceses.69  Since 1991, when this seminary reopened (having been 
closed by the government in 1979), until the change in policy, Stella Maris had 
to present a list of forty to forty-five candidates to the government, which 
would approve no more than thirty of them.  With the change, in September, 
the seminary admitted (on its own) forty-four candidates.  Significantly, Father 
Pierre Pham Ngoc Phi drew a direct link between trade liberalization and 
greater freedom of conscience: 
This privilege can be seen as a sign the government is gradually loosening its 
policy on the local Church’s priestly formation, since the country joined the 
World Trade Organization in 2006.70 
Indeed, two other seminaries—in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City—obtained the 
same governmental authorization in 2005 and 2007 respectively.  Admittedly, 
this illustration is at the multilateral level, and it does not appear the terms of 
accession to the WTO obligated Vietnam to improve its climate of religious 
freedom.  Yet imagine what might be achieved at an intensive FTA level 
where the topic is addressed squarely. 
Indubitably, a trade accord, whether multilateral or an FTA, ought to 
promote neither a particular faith nor a specific kind of worship.  For two 
reasons, promotion should not equal favoritism but rather be non-
 
 69. Catholic News Service, Vietnamese Priest: Government Loosens Control of Seminary 
Admissions, Mar. 26, 2008, http://catholicnews.com/datea/briefs/cns/20080326.htm. 
 70. Vietnam: More Permission For Annual Seminary Recruitment Seen As Sign of 
Government Openness, UNION OF CATHOLIC ASIAN NEWS, Mar. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.ucanews.com/2008/03/26/more-permission-for-annual-seminary-recruitment-seen-as-
sign-of-government-openness (emphasis added). 
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discriminatory in a most favored nation (MFN)- and national treatment-like 
sense.  First, such favoritism does not promote authentic freedom of 
conscience.  It serves narrow interests of certain clergy, opening up one line of 
belief yet clamping down on another.  (Consider the post-9/11 controversy 
about Saudi funding of extremist Wahhabi madrassas (Islamic schools), and 
the point should be clear.)  The end result can be theocracy, an unholy alliance 
of religious and secular political authority, and suppression of disfavored 
religions.71 
Second, from at least some religious (including Christian) perspectives, 
only a choice to love God, commensurate with free will, is meaningful.  As 
Pope Benedict XVI suggested on January 18, 2008, to Bishops of the Arab 
Region on their ad limina Apostolorum visit to the Vatican: 
Obstacles on the paths to unity must never extinguish enthusiasm for creating 
the conditions for a daily dialogue, which is a prelude to unity. 
Meeting with members of other religions, Jews and Muslims, is a daily reality 
for you.  In your Countries, the quality of relations between believers acquires 
a very special meaning, since it is at the same time a witness borne to the one 
God and a contribution to establishing more brotherly relations between people 
and between the various components of your societies. 
A better mutual knowledge is therefore necessary in order to foster ever 
greater respect for human dignity, the equality of rights and duties of people, 
and renewed attention to the needs of each one, particularly those who are the 
poorest. 
Moreover, I firmly hope that authentic religious freedom may be effective 
everywhere and that the right of each individual to practise his or her religion 
freely, or to change it, may not be hindered.  This is a primordial right of every 
human being.72 
Put bluntly, compelled adoration is utterly orthogonal to the inalienable dignity 
of the human person. 
The key point about a direct effect between trade liberalization and 
freedom of conscience is that an FTA would require each member country to 
guarantee this freedom.  The FTA would articulate specific manifestations of 
this freedom, such as (inter alia) the right to (1) establish teaching facilities to 
train clergy; (2) construct places of worship; (3) engage in organized religious 
 
 71. See generally Promote Human Dignity, Foster Legitimate Freedom, L’OSSERVATORE 
ROMANO, Jan. 9, 2008, at 10 (“[T]o promote human dignity in an integral way . . .  [requires] 
effectively combat[ing] intolerance and discrimination against Christians, Jews, Muslims, and 
members of other religions. . . . [Because] [r]eligious discrimination can only effectively be 
addressed if all religions are equally respected and protected.”) (alteration to original). 
 72. Christians with the Mission to be “Artisans of Peace and Justice,” L’OSSERVATORE 
ROMANO, Jan. 30, 2008, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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services; and (4) communicate and transmit religious information to interested 
(or potentially interested) individuals.  Moreover, the FTA would commit 
member countries to minimize state monitoring or interference with the overall 
guarantee and the enumerated rights.  Exceptional circumstances would be 
limited to security threats (e.g., active engagement in planning violence, as 
occurred with Branch Davidians, or certain groups acting in the name of 
Islam), and then only in accordance with broadly acceptable law enforcement 
standards. 
Notwithstanding even the best legal drafting of this guarantee and 
exceptions to it, eliminating the specter of abusing such rights is impossible.  
Therefore, the FTA also might establish an independent commission that 
would ensure member countries adhere to the guarantee and itemized rights.  
That commission also could play an adjudicatory function, sponsoring a 
mechanism to resolve claims that a particular FTA country has infringed on the 
guarantee.  Remedies might involve monetary sanctions, suspension of trade 
benefits, or both, all with a view to underscoring the proposition that the FTA 
ought not to detract from freedom of worship. 
The indirect effect of trade liberalization on freedom of conscience 
operates through the economic climate created by that liberalization.  A trade 
accord that impoverishes people in one country or a segment of the population 
(e.g., cotton farmers) hampers their ability to exercise whatever freedom of 
worship they might have.  The FTA to which their country is a party embodies 
the formal guarantee of that freedom, but they can rarely, if ever, exercise this 
freedom.  Their daily routine is consumed with an oft-degrading search for 
food and potable water.  Their milieu is squalid, congested and hot.  To borrow 
the terminology of Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen and apply his 
analysis from Development as Freedom (1999), people in one FTA country are 
un-free.  They are developmentally disabled from participating in the benefits 
of open trade because such trade reifies their hideous status quo.  They lack the 
capacity—nutrition, primary (much less secondary) education, modest housing 
and medical care—to make use of, or even come to appreciate, those benefits.  
Their principal contact with a place of worship is less to contemplate or pray, 
and even less to explore their innate spiritual dimension.  It is more to depend 
on the charity for sustenance afforded by the church, gurudwara, mosque, 
synagogue or temple. 
What particular human rights, in addition to freedom of conscience itself, 
ought an FTA promote to help create an economic climate that facilitates 
individual spiritual development?73  Consider Pacem in Terris (1963), in which 
 
 73. Manifestly, human rights abuses are of increasing importance to trade law, as evidenced 
(for example) by the raucous debate on China’s entry into the WTO, and by the burgeoning 
literature on the link between trade and human rights.  See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An 
Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (2000) (discussing 
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Pope John XXIII identifies fundamental human rights that follow from respect 
for human dignity.  (These rights have been articulated, in a variety of ways 
and forms over the centuries in previously issued Church documents.)  In 
summary form, there are ten such human rights, as follows:74 
1st. The Right to Life and Development. 
Man has a right to live, to bodily integrity and the means necessary for 
proper development, to food, clothing, medical care, rest, [and] necessary 
social services . . . [which include care during] unemployment or whenever 
through no fault of his own he is deprived of the means of livelihood.75 
2nd. The Right to Be Respected. 
[Man] has a right to be respected, to a good name, to freedom in 
investigating the truth, and—within the limits of the moral order and the 
common good—to freedom of speech and publication, to pursue whatever 
 
China’s WTO accession).  In a variety of United Nations, the Holy See has emphasized not only 
this linkage, but also the related linkages to labor and environmental rights.  Environmentally 
Sensitive, L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Mar. 19, 2008, at 10 (reprinting the Feb. 12, 2008 
intervention at the General Assembly by Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Nuncio and 
Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations in New York, on the issue of climate 
change).  Of course, the purpose here is not to pursue any of these links.  That would take the 
discussion potentially far off course into topics worthy of dedicated, extended treatments 
themselves.  Rather, the broad question is whether America’s FTAs respect the rights enumerated 
above in a manner leading to greater freedom of worship.  Decent Work for All, L’OSSERVATORE 
ROMANO, Feb. 27, 2008, at 10 (urging that unemployment offends human dignity and is 
corrected by paying attention to the needs of the afflicted).  See generally Garcia, supra note 37, 
at 51 (concerning human rights and trade) 
 74. See POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 29, ¶¶ 11–27, listed in CHARLES, supra note 27, at 30–
31).  Both history and current events adduce that not every political or economic society respects 
each of these human rights to the fullest degree (or even to a minimal degree) at all times.  
Human dignity is under attack, nearly at any given historical moment, in one or more societies—
hence a reason for the tenacious defense of it by the Catholic Church and in the life and writings 
of Pope John Paul II.  This defense sometimes is put in terms of the duty to do justice toward 
others: 
Human society demands that men be guided by justice, respect the rights of others and do 
their duty.  They must feel the needs of others as their own.  So considered, we think of 
society as primarily a spiritual reality.  Its foundation is truth, brought into effect by 
justice.  Such an order, absolute, immutable in its principles, finds its source in the true 
personal and transcendent God, who is the first truth and the highest good, the deepest 
source from which human society can draw its genuine vitality. 
POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 29, ¶¶ 35–38, quoted in CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31–32 
(emphasis added). 
 75. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 30 (emphasis omitted). 
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profession he may choose, [and] to be accurately informed about public 
events.76 
3rd. The Right to Education. 
[Man has the right to] a good general education, technical or professional 
training consistent with the degree of educational development in his own 
country, to engage in advanced studies, to (as far possible) positions of 
responsibility commensurate with his talent and skill.77 
4th. The Right to Worship. 
[Man has a right] to worship God according to his conscience and profess 
his religion in private and in public.78 
5th. The Right to Choose a Lifestyle. 
[Man has the right] to choose for [himself] the life which appeals to [him], 
to marry and found a family, in which man and women have equal rights; 
or not to marry.79 
6th. The Right to Work. 
Man has the right to the opportunity to work and to take personal initiative 
in it.  Conditions in it must not be such as to weaken physical or moral 
fibre.80 
 
 76. Id. at 30.  See also MATTHEW F. KOHMESCHER, CATHOLICISM TODAY: A SURVEY OF 
CATHOLIC BELIEF AND PRACTICE 156 (Paulist Press 3rd ed. 1999) (“We all have the duty not 
only to respect the basic rights of others but to work with them in order that these rights be 
respected, cherished and promoted by all.  We should do this not to gain our own selfish ends but 
because it is right and just to treat others as we would want to be treated.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, 
supra note 29, ¶¶ 63–65 (declaring that “[t]he influence of the State must never be exerted to the 
extent of depriving the individual citizen of his freedom,” and that “[i]t must augment his 
freedom while guaranteeing protection of everyone’s rights”). 
 77. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 30. 
 78. Id. at 30.  See also JOHN PAUL II, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE SECRET OF TRUE 
PEACE (MESSAGE OF HIS HOLINESS POPE JOHN PAUL II FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE WORLD 
DAY OF PEACE) ¶ 5 (United States Catholic Conference 1999) (stating “[r]eligious freedom 
therefore constitutes the very heart of human rights” because “[r]eligion expresses the deepest 
aspirations of the human person . . . [and] basically it offers the answer to the question of the true 
meaning of life,” and adding that “no one can be compelled to accept a particular religion, 
whatever the circumstances or motive”). 
 79. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 30.  See generally MASSARO, supra note 35, at 124–27 
(discussing family life). 
 80. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  As Pope Leo XIII states: 
[T]he first [task] . . . is to save [ ] workers from the [brutality] of [those] who [make] use 
[of] human beings as mere instruments [in the creation of wealth, impose a burden of 
labour, which] stupef[ies] [ ] minds and [exhausts] [ ] bodies.  Let workers and 
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7th. The Right to Associate and Participate. 
Man has a right to engage in economic activities suited to his degree of 
responsibility; to a wage in accordance with justice; to ownership of 
private property, including productive goods.81 
 
employers make bargains freely about wages, but there underlies a requirement of natural 
justice higher and older than any bargain; a wage ought not to be insufficient for needs. 
POPE LEO XIII, supra note 31, ¶ 45, quoted in CHARLES supra note 27, at 34 (emphasis added). 
  This task is “first” because its fulfillment is part of what it means to respect human 
dignity.  As Pope John Paul II explains in Laborem Exercens, it is a person who does work, who 
“ought to imitate God, his Creator, in working,” and who “by means of work . . . participates in 
the activity of God himself . . . [as] given particular prominence by Jesus Christ,” and “[t]he 
Christian finds in human work a small part of the Cross of Christ”).  POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
ENCYCLICAL LETTER, LABOREM EXERCENS [On Human Work] ¶¶ 25–27 (United States Catholic 
Conference Sept. 14, 1981) (emphasis added).  See also id. ¶¶ 16–19 (discussing the right and 
duty to work, and identifying “no more important way of securing a just relationship between the 
worker and the employer” than payment of “just remuneration” because it is “a practical means 
whereby the vast majority of people can have access to those goods which are intended for 
common use:  both the goods of nature and manufactured goods,” and “is the concrete means of 
verifying the justice of the whole socioeconomic system”) (emphasis added); CHARLES, supra 
note 27, at 61 (stating “[i]t is the task of the state to ensure economic freedom and to see that that 
freedom is not abused, but that, through it, all may have access to the means of a decent 
livelihood”) and 63 ((1) discussing the spiritual significance of work, in that man—as made in 
God’s image—shares in the creative activity of God through work, and can liken vicissitudes at 
work to the hardships endured by Jesus; (2) arguing Jesus gave work a new dignity because he 
spent most of his earthly life working with his hands; and (3) affirming “[t]he subject of work is 
more important than the work done or the object achieved by it)” (emphasis original). 
 81. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  As Pope John XXIII writes: 
The dignity of the human person also requires that every man enjoy the right to act freely 
and responsibly.  For this reason, therefore, in social relations man should exercise his 
rights, fulfill his obligations and, in the countless forms of collaboration with others, act 
chiefly on his own responsibility and initiative.  This is to be done in such a way that each 
one acts on his own decision, of set purpose and from a consciousness of his obligation, 
without being moved by force or pressure brought to bear on him externally.  For any 
human society that is established on relations of force must be regarded as inhuman, 
inasmuch as the personality of its members is repressed or restricted, when in fact they 
should be provided with appropriate incentives and means for developing and perfecting 
themselves. 
POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 29, ¶ 34 (emphasis added).  It is important, of course, to discern 
with care “legitimate” aims and “appropriate” incentives.  Pope Leo XIII counseled that workers 
would be empowered by banding together in an association, but that workers’ associations 
operated under “a general and constant law,” namely, “that the individual members of the 
association secure, so far as possible, an increase in the goods of body, of soul, and of 
prosperity.”  POPE LEO XIII, supra note 31, ¶ 76.  See also POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 78, ¶ 
20 (observing that by protecting worker rights and enhancing worker solidarity in a constructive 
manner within the framework of the common good, and by eschewing class egoism, conflict and 
political power battles, trade unions play an indispensable role in advancing social justice).  See 
generally MASSARO, supra note 35, at 138–141 (on worker rights and labor unions). 
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8th. The Right to Private Property. 
[Man has the right to] form associations with their fellows, to confer on 
such associations the type of organisation best calculated to achieve their 
aims [including ownership of private property and economic assets (i.e., 
productive resources)].82 
9th. The Right to Migrate. 
[Man] has the right to freedom of movement and residence in his own state 
and, where just reasons favour it, to emigrate to other countries.83 
10th. The Right to Legal Protection. 
[Man has the right to have the aforementioned human rights enshrined in 
the legal system of his country,] to take an active part in public life, [and to 
the enforcement of these rights in an efficacious and unbiased way.]84 
 
 82. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  See id. at 61 (stating man “must have freedom to choose 
his work, to prosper at it and to own property,” and “[u]nless he has these freedoms all other 
freedoms are at risk from his economic masters”) (emphasis added).  Interestingly, Church 
Fathers such as Saint Ambrose viewed private property as an illusion because all property 
belongs to God.  Private ownership, and more specifically inequality of distribution, was 
unknown before the Fall, and was said by them to be a consequence of sin.  Consequently, Saint 
Ambrose characterized almsgiving by an avaricious person as the restitution of goods stolen from 
the poor.  See BOHR, supra note 66, at 330.  See generally MASSARO, supra note 35, at 132–138 
(discussing the rights and responsibilities of property ownership). 
 83. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 78, ¶ 23 
(declaring that “[m]an has the right to leave his native land for various motives—and also the 
right to return—in order to seek better conditions of life in another country,” and that “[t]he most 
important thing is that the person working away from his native land, whether as a permanent 
emigrant or as a seasonal worker, should not be placed at a disadvantage in comparison with the 
other workers in that society in the matter of working rights”) (emphasis added). 
 84. CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  The government authority in a political or economic 
society is responsible for providing this protection.  That responsibility is especially important 
with respect to poor members in the society. 
  This importance derives from more than just the preference for the poor (a Catholic 
response to the third moral problem, discussed below).  As Pope Leo XIII put it bluntly, “[r]ich 
people can protect themselves; the poor have to depend above all upon the state.”  POPE LEO XIII, 
supra note 31, ¶¶ 37–38, quoted in CHARLES, supra note 27, at 35. 
  This responsibility does not inexorably compel the conclusion that democracy is the best 
form of government, and Catholic Social Justice Theory does not go that far.  Saint Thomas 
Aquinas urged a mixed form of government, combining monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, 
thereby providing the respective advantages of an authoritative figure, involvement of qualified 
persons and choice by the people.  See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Ia IIae Q. 
105 Art. 1 (Richard J. Regan ed., University of Scranton 1999), quoted in CHARLES supra note 
27, at 40. 
  More generally, for a discussion of Gelasian theory (named for Pope Gelasius, whose 
pontificate was in the 5th century, from 492–496 A.D.), see BOHR, supra note 66, at 309.  In 
brief, the theory holds that the Church and State are powers established by God on earth to 
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Applying this listing to the trade realm, it may be suggested that an FTA 
ought to promote (or at least not undermine) not only the Fourth right (i.e., the 
direct effect), but also the other nine rights (i.e., the indirect effects).  Trade 
liberalization designed with the other nine rights in mind may assist in 
expanding the space an individual needs to meaningfully exercise freedom of 
worship. 
The difficulty of proceeding with this kind of design is fashioning specific 
negotiating criteria.  If trade affects freedom of conscience through the 
remaining rights, then what particular outcomes in an FTA should be sought to 
promote those other rights and thereby indirectly support this freedom?  The 
Sixth and Seventh rights are explicitly related to the conditions of labor, and 
the Ninth right is about freedom of migration.85  In turn, the Sixth and Seventh 
rights can be translated into labor rights provisions of an FTA.  The Ninth right 
can inform services trade liberalization (by expanding temporary worker visa 
programs under Mode IV delivery of services).  However, what trade 
negotiation position is spawned by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth or 
Tenth right?  The Firth right is economic; the Second right is about politics; the 
Third about education; the Fifth about family and community; and the Eighth 
and Tenth about the rule of law.  All of them are general.  It could well be that 
some of the rights lead to conflicting negotiating positions redolent of 
contemporary trade debates. 
For example, enhancing economic status through better food, clothing, 
shelter and medical care (the First right) arguably is had by free trade—or by 
protecting certain constituencies from exploitation (say, by foreign utility and 
water services providers, which raise costs and cut distribution to poor or rural 
communities).  Private property rights (the Eighth right) may be expanded by 
 
operate autonomously in different spheres, the ecclesiological and the secular, respectively, and 
that Church and State authorities are to respect and support each other.  This theory dominated 
most of the Middle Ages, though the reign of Charlemagne was marked by a “theocratic 
character,” and starting in the 11th century A.D., conflict between popes and emperors was “the 
norm for the next several centuries.”  Id. at 309.  The opposite of Gelasian theory is “hierocratic” 
theory, articulated by Pope Boniface VIII in Unam Sanctam (1302), whereby the Church is 
viewed as superior to the State, hence a pontiff is authorized to intervene in political affairs to 
save souls.  Id. at 311.  For a discussion, of the grand theological synthesis of political theories, 
developed by Saint Thomas Aquinas, see id. at 311.  See also CHARLES, supra note 27, at 50–54. 
  The responsibility for providing legal protection of human rights also does not 
inexorably mean the government must regulate the ownership and use of private property.  
Regulation entails the risk of undermining the institution of private property.  Hence, the key 
principle that ought to constrain the government from excessive intervention is promotion of the 
common good.  See id. at 61. 
 85. See CHARLES, supra note 27, at 31.  Note, then, that closely allied with the trade— 
human rights link is the trade—labor rights link, because some work-related rights are claimed to 
be human rights.  The above list (most directly the sixth and seventh rights, and indirectly the 
first, third, ninth and tenth rights) are examples. 
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free trade, or extant ownership patterns that are skewed in favor of elites may 
be worsened by open trade (because they are in the best position to capture 
gains and have no legal obligation to share them).  In brief, promoting freedom 
of conscience indirectly through other variables (i.e., rights) is problematic.  
Depending on the variable and context, the best outcome, in terms of a specific 
rule in an FTA, may be indeterminate. 
D. Freedom of Conscience and the Indirect Effects of a Peoples Trade 
Agreement 
A final remark about putting into practice a religiously grounded concept 
of equal human dignity ought to be made.  Inspired partly by some socialist-
oriented Latin American leaders during the first decade of the new millennium 
such as Bolivian President Eva Morales and Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez, the idea of a “PTA” has emerged.  This acronym means “Peoples 
Trade Agreement.”  (The Spanish acronym is “TCP,” for El Tratado de 
Comercio entre los Pueblos, i.e., “Trade Treaty for the Peoples”).  A PTA is a 
new kind of trade agreement, being an economic alternative and political 
challenge to a conventional American-style FTA. 
In April 2006, Bolivia and Venezuela joined Cuba in signing a ten-point 
statement of principles on which their existing (and presumably any future) 
trade agreement ought to be based.  (Technically, the extant accord is the 
Acuerdo Para La Aplicación de la Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
Nuestra América (ALBA) y el Tratrado de Comercio de los Pueblos (TCP), 
which means “Accord for the Application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Peoples of our America and the Peoples’ Trade Agreements.”  In 2007, 
Nicaragua joined ALBA, and in 2008 Dominica also joined.  In other words, 
ALBA is the actual trade agreement, and the TCP embodies the principles on 
which ALBA is based.) The ten TCP points are: 
1. The Trade Treaty of the Peoples, which was proposed by President Evo 
Morales, is a response to the failed neo-liberal model, based as it is on 
deregulation, privatization and the indiscriminate opening of markets. 
2. TCP understands trade and investment not as ends in themselves, but 
rather as means toward development.  Therefore, its aim is not total 
market liberalization and the shrinking of the State but rather seeking 
benefits for all peoples. 
3. TCP promotes a model of trade integration between people that limits and 
regulates the rights of foreign investors and multinationals so that they 
serve the purpose of national productive development. 
4. TCP does not prohibit the use of mechanisms to promote 
industrialisation, nor does it prevent protection of areas of the internal 
market that are necessary to preserve the most vulnerable sectors of 
society. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
44 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:9 
5. TCP recognises the right of peoples to define their own agriculture and 
food policies and to protect and regulate national agricultural production 
in order to prevent domestic markets being inundated with excess 
products of other countries. 
6. TCP considers that vital services must depend on public companies as 
exclusive providers, regulated by the State.  The negotiation of any trade 
agreement must hold as a central principle that the majority of basic 
services are public goods that can not be handed over to the market. 
7. TCP proposes complementarity instead of competition; co-existence with 
nature against irrational exploitation of resources; defence of social 
property against extreme privatisation. 
8. TCP urges participating countries involved in a process of integration 
based on solidarity to give priority to national companies as exclusive 
providers to public entities. 
9. With the proposal for a Trade Treaty of the Peoples, Bolivia is proposing 
a true integration that transcends economic and trade considerations; the 
philosophy is based on achieving an endogenous just and sustainable 
development based on community principles that takes into account 
national differences. 
10. TCP proposes a different logic of relationship between human beings, in 
other words a distinct model of co-existence that isn’t based on 
competition and the urge to accumulate which takes advantage of and 
exploits to the maximum human labour and natural resources.86 
The TCP is not designed to be a “Catholic Trade Agreement.”  There is no 
such thing, any more than there is “Catholic Chemistry.” 
In addition, promotion of freedom of conscience is not the direct aim or 
intent of a TCP.  What, then, motivated Presidents Morales and Chávez to sign 
a TCP?  One answer suggests the agreement might not be new in concept.  
Consciously or not, these countries may well have done little else than 
resurrect socialist-style trade policies popular in Latin America in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  These policies were advocated by leading economists like Paul 
Baran, Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer.  Another answer is a genuine sense that 
a conventional market capitalist FTA will not work for them.  President 
Morales vowed in March 2006 that Bolivia never would negotiate an FTA with 
 
 86. Movimiento Boliviano por la Soberanía y la Integración solidaria de los pueblos: Contra 
el TLC y el ALCA, Trade Treaty of the Peoples, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.boliviasoberana.org/ 
blog/_archives/_2006/4/13/1896922.html (emphasis added).  See also Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Cuba Sign Alternative ‘Trade Treaty for the Peoples’, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) Leave No. 18, 
at 692 (May 4, 2006), available at http://pubs.bna.com (quoting the first, third, and ninth points, 
and other portions). 
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the United States.  Yet, in August 2006, Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia 
Linera explained: 
  Bolivia wants trade relations with the entire world.  I traveled to the United 
States to try to advance a trade pact.  But, we can’t just have free trade under 
the old rules, because it is too aggressive for our economy. 
  For example, how is a small farmer in Bolivia going to compete with 
farmers from countries that use the latest tractors and other technologies?  It’s 
like trying to make the 2nd century compete with the 21st century.  The same 
goes for our urban small businesses.  How are we going to compete with giant 
factories under such conditions?87 
Another answer is that the TCP is about self-interest.  Soybean economics 
may have provoked the Bolivia-Venezuela-Cuba accord.  When Colombia 
signed an FTA with the United States on February 27, 2006, it agreed to 
purchase a 600,000 ton quota of American soybeans.88  Until that point, 
Bolivia had shipped 500,000 tons of soybeans to Colombia worth $166 million 
in 2005.  The U.S.-Colombia FTA thus diverts soybean trade away from 
Bolivia and toward the U.S.   Bolivian President Morales responded 
immediately with the PTA proposal.  Andean region politics reinforced his 
call.89 
Accordingly, the focus of an examination of the TCP through the lens of 
religion and equal human dignity ought to be on indirect effects.  That is, in 
terms of indirect effects, might this kind of trilateral accord be consistent with 
(or even advance) certain social justice principles, including equal human 
dignity, found in religious traditions?  To what extent might a TCP operate 
indirectly through supervening variables on the economic circumstances in 
which that freedom may be exercised? 
As the TCP is a new accord, it is premature to render a final judgment.  
And, of course, this type of agreement could prove to be a dismal economic 
failure.  Like many of its socialist-oriented predecessors, a TCP might render 
workers and peasants materially worse off, or elites materially better off, than 
 
 87. See Bolivia Looks for New Kind of Trade Pact With U.S., While Seeking ATPDEA 
Extension, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1198 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at 
http://pubs.bna.com. 
 88. Id. 
 89. As intimated, there are additional answers, based on political economy.  For example, 
the Community of Andean Nations (CAN)—founded in 1969, and comprised of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—had been disintegrating.  Not only Colombia, but also 
Peru (in April 2006), signed FTAs with the United States.  Further, in December 2005, 
MERCOSUR admitted Bolivia and Venezuela to full membership, and in April 2006, Venezuelan 
President Chavez announced his country was withdrawing from CAN (and sought to make 
MERCOSUR an anti-American bloc) and called the Peruvian President, Alejandro Toledo, a 
traitor to South America for signing an FTA with the United States. 
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before.  That outcome hardly would be a positive indirect effect on freedom of 
religion. 
For now, at least on paper it appears there may be some common ground.  
The Second Point indicates economic agreements ought not to be ends in 
themselves, but rather means to an end, and that one appropriate end is 
promotion of the common good.  The Fourth point is redolent of a Catholic 
Social Justice Principle known as the preferential option for the poor.90  The 
Ninth Point seems to call for solidarity among people across borders on the 
basis of more than economic self-interest and the building of relationships that 
are just and sustainable.  Finally, the Tenth point calls attention to the human 
person, not merely to business profits, in respect of trade agreements and their 
effects. 
IV.  EQUAL HUMAN DIGNITY CRITERIA FOR FTAS – A LEGALISTIC APPROACH 
Failure to tease out any specifics means equal human dignity remains 
potentially an ambiguous, amorphous concept susceptible to different, even 
contrasting, interpretations.  Lawyers who deal with FTAs need not a fist full 
of sand, but some clear markers. 
Accordingly, consider in addition to the philosophical and religious 
perspectives a third approach to identifying equal human dignity criteria for 
FTAs: a legalistic one.  What do each of the words “equal,” “human” and 
“dignity” mean in the context of international trade law?  Responding to this 
question yields three specific criteria: 
 From “human,” the criterion is neutrality. 
 From “equal,” the criterion is non-discrimination. 
 From “dignity,” the criterion is respect. 
To be clear, this approach is informed by literalism (as the word “legalistic” 
connotes), lexicography (i.e., reference to dictionary usages of terms) and 
common sense.  “Legalism,” in the sense used here, simply refers to 
contemplating what key terms mean and considering the ramifications of those 
meanings.  The recourse to philosophy or theology is neither direct nor 
immediate.  However, the results could well be relatively similar under a 
rigorous philosophical or systematic religious approach. 
A. “Human” and Neutrality 
It is easiest, perhaps, to start with “human.” As the middle word, it 
operates as an adjective for dignity; it is the dignity of humans at stake.  In that 
middle position, it is also part of what “equal” modifies.  “Human” plays a 
noun-like role, in that it is humans—namely, their dignity—that is to be equal. 
 
 90. See BHALA, supra note 24, at 432–438. 
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The word “human,” then, indicates that what is equal, and what dignity is 
at issue, is whatever (or, better put, whoever) is “human.”  There is no 
differentiation among humans. The phrase is not, for example, “equal 
businessman dignity,” nor is it “equal consumer dignity.”  The equal dignity of 
no one kind of human is preferred above any other kind.  Rather, the dignity of 
all people affected by an FTA must be protected, and in equal measure.  The 
subjects of an FTA are all humans in the countries that are parties to the FTA, 
with no one sub-group, i.e., constituency, preferred.  In that sense, the word 
“human” is a horizontal concept.  The FTA is truly a collective endeavor 
involving all people of the member countries, not just the capitalist over the 
laborer, the landowner over the tenant, the manufacturer over the farmer, the 
producer over the consumer, the service professional over the craftsman or the 
public official over the private agent.  Critically, “human” means the FTA does 
not favor the American over the non-American. 
The word “human” also has a vertical connotation.  Even within the 
various aforementioned categories, negotiating, drafting, implementing or 
enforcing an FTA does not prefer one kind of human to another.  For example, 
among capitalists, the steel company manager and the surgical instrument 
company manager are the same.  Among farmers, no distinction exists between 
the cotton farmer and the corn farmer.  Among service professionals, the 
lawyer and the engineer are united in their humanity.  Further, the word 
“human” is vertical in nature in that each person within each category or sub-
category of a constituency, from natural conception to natural death, is the 
subject of the FTA.  An FTA affects not just adult males who, for instance, are 
laborers in the auto industry, but also the children of those workers, who, upon 
maturity, may seek employment in that industry or by force of circumstance 
may have to look to another line of work, and who one day will be retirees. 
In sum, “human” is horizontal in that it covers all people in all sectors of 
the economies of the countries that are parties to an FTA.  It is “vertical” in 
that it covers all people within a particular economic sector or a country that is 
a party to the FTA, and all people throughout their natural life cycle.  To be 
sure, “human” does not mean that all people in the FTA members will, in 
actuality, be affected by the FTA, much less by a particular rule in the FTA.  
For any given person (e.g., a textile mill worker), an FTA rule (e.g., on sugar) 
may be irrelevant at this juncture in his life.  In theory, any rule could 
potentially affect any person if that person engages in the behavior (in the 
example, sugar production or processing) that is within the purview of the rule. 
In other words, the rules are facially neutral in how and why they are 
written and in the pattern in which they are practiced.  Here, then, is the first 
criterion to extract from the concept of “equal human dignity,” and specifically 
the word “human”—neutrality, in both a horizontal and vertical sense.  The 
FTA rules treat as a world citizen each individual, natural person in every 
country that is party to the FTA.  The rules are not drafted or used for the 
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American over the Arab, for the Israeli over the Palestinian, or for the French 
Canadian over the non-French Canadian. 
Consequently, should a person change his behavior or nationality and 
come within the purview of the rule, the rule itself is not a disincentive to this 
change.  Similarly, if a country is party to two or more FTAs (as is true for the 
United States), then the diversity of the different constituencies encompassed 
by the different FTAs is accommodated by ensuring each FTA embraces all 
peoples in the member countries.  For instance, suppose an FTA between the 
United States and Morocco differentiates (e.g., by a preferential rule of origin) 
Moroccan wool sweater producers from other Moroccan textile and apparel 
producers, whereas an FTA between the United States and Oman does not do 
so.  “Human” means that all wool sweater producers, actual or potential, in the 
United States, Morocco and Oman, are to be treated as such.  To treat one 
differently, such as to impose restrictions on Moroccan wool sweaters, is to 
single out the Moroccan producer for special (in this instance, less favorable) 
treatment, leading (as discussed in Section IV.B, infra) to discrimination. 
A final point about the word “human” concerns its inter-generational 
implications.  To what extent do, or should, the rights of the unborn factor into 
an FTA?  Interestingly, a commonly accepted principle in international 
environmental law is inter-generational equity.  Succinctly put, this principle 
holds that “in meeting the needs of present generations, the needs of future 
generations should not be sacrificed.”91  The principle of intergenerational 
equity associates logically with the concept of sustainable development.  An 
FTA seeking to promote “equal dignity” in respect of environmental rights 
indeed would embrace the unborn in its definition of humanity. 
B. “Equality” and Non-Discrimination 
As for “equality,” the rather obvious criterion emanating from the term is 
non-discrimination.  That would mean every FTA to which the United States is 
a party neither intentionally creates, nor tolerates in its implementation, actual 
or potential, de jure or de facto, discrimination.  All humans living in the FTA 
countries are treated as if they hold the same citizenship.  No distinction exists 
between a domestic or foreign person, i.e., the national treatment manifestation 
of non-discrimination is pervasive and without exception, notably including 
subsidies relating to production or production processes.92 
 
 91. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (Thomson-West 
2006). 
 92. This criterion begs an obvious question—what about the treatment of humans who are 
not citizens of a country with which the United States has an FTA?  Concededly, “equal human 
dignity” seems to mean “equal human dignity for humans in an FTA.” An imperfect response is 
that just because, as a practical matter, equal human dignity cannot be promoted in all countries at 
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How is “equality” different from “humanity”?  The answer is the two are 
complementary, with “humanity” being the foundation of, or leading to, 
“equality.”  “Humanity” highlights natural personhood and demands horizontal 
and vertical neutrality across all natural persons, without any further sub-
division among them.  As basic (even simplistic) as it may seem, the point is 
nothing more or less than stressing that human beings are who FTAs ultimately 
affect.  “Equality” shifts the focus slightly to the creation of categories of 
natural persons and the actual or potential differential treatment among the 
categorized persons.  It forbids discrimination against one or more categories 
of natural persons. 
In an FTA between the United States and Jordan, for example, American 
and Jordanian persons, natural and legal, are treated alike for all purposes 
governed by the FTA.  If there are more than two countries in the FTA—e.g., 
(NAFTA), involving the United States, Canada and Mexico or a hypothetical 
Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) comprising the United States 
and many Arab countries and possibly Israel, too—then all humans (and non-
natural legal person) have the same rights under that FTA, plus no persons 
from one country are preferred over persons from another country.93  In other 
words, an FTA involving multiple countries adheres to both aspects of non-
discrimination: national treatment, as between American and non-Americans; 
and MFN treatment, as among all humans.  The latter feature would mean it 
would be impermissible, for example, in a MEFTA for the United States to 
prefer wool sweaters from Israeli workers over wool sweaters from Jordanian 
or Moroccan workers (assuming all the countries are MEFTA members).  Put 
differently, the critique offered by one observer of the Jordan FTA—”[t]he 
 
once through the multilateral trading system does not mean it should not be promoted in some 
countries now through a web of FTAs. 
 93. In May 2003, President George W. Bush declared it was American trade policy to create 
a United States-MEFTA by 2013.  MEFTA would comprise nearly all countries in the region.  
The United States has signed and implemented FTAs with Jordan (2001), Morocco (2004), 
Bahrain (2006) and Oman (2006), and of course has had an FTA with Israel (since 1985).  FTA 
talks have bogged down and are moribund between the United States and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) (launched in March 2005) over an array of commercial matters.  For political and 
economic reasons, the United States (in 2006) decided against commencing FTA talks with 
Egypt. 
  Countries in doubt for inclusion in MEFTA, while not expressly identified or excluded a 
priori, seem likely to be Iran (for political and national security reasons), Israel (for political 
reasons), Syria (for political and national security reasons), and Turkey (because of its links to 
and interest in joining the European Union (EU)).  Certainly, without renewed trade negotiating 
authority (which expired on June 30, 2007), there is virtually no chance of a MEFTA, much less 
any further FTAs in the Middle East.  See Bush Says U.S. Open to Mideast Trade But Suggests 
No Early FTA Talks with Egypt, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 88–89 (Jan. 17, 2008); Some 
Progress Likely on 5th Anniversary of Bush MEFTA Initiative; No New FTAs, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 3, at 102 (Jan. 17, 2008). 
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United States in the FTA did not take the interests of Jordan into account”—
would be untenable.94 
To be sure, “equal” does not mean that a country in an FTA is forbidden 
from discriminating on matters not covered by the FTA.  Such matters likely 
would include voting rights, serving on a jury, receiving subsidized education, 
health care or housing.  Conversely, trade liberalization in goods and services, 
plus intellectual property (IP) matters, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
immigration, all likely would be embraced by the FTA.  “Equal” would mean 
whatever rights and obligations are created by the FTA must be accorded and 
imposed, respectively, for all humans (and, again, non-natural legal persons) 
throughout the countries in the FTA.  Citizenship, for purposes of the FTA, 
would not matter; being human would be enough for entitlement to equality. 
For instance, it would not be permissible to import beans, corn or sugar 
from Canada, but not Mexico, in NAFTA.  Similarly, favoring Bahraini over 
Moroccan banks in a MEFTA would not be allowed.  Still another example 
concerns pollution.  The principle of non-discrimination is a widely accepted 
principle of international environmental law.  It requires that a country, when 
addressing pollution originating from within its borders, not differentiate 
between pollution affecting itself and pollution harming other countries.95  This 
principle is manifest (inter alia) in the 1991 Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, which requires countries to 
assess with equal vigor and even-handedness the extraterritorial and domestic 
environmental repercussions of a proposed project in their territory. 
Notably, equal treatment for humans ought to be logically consistent 
across FTAs.  The United States, like many countries, has multiple FTAs.  
Different degrees of non-discrimination, depending on the FTA partner, would 
sniff of discrimination.  That is, a consistent, rigorous equality criterion (non-
discrimination in the sense of national and MFN treatment) should be found in 
all trade-liberalizing arrangements.  By way of hypothetical example, with two 
bilateral FTAs—one with Israel, and one with an Arab country—equality in 
respect of matters covered by the FTAs ought to be horizontal.  The United 
 
 94. Bashar H. Malkawi, Lessons from the United States—Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 14 
INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 26, 38 (2008).  Highlighting unequal aspects of the FTA rules of origin 
for textiles and apparel, as well as the causation standard for safeguards and visa commitments in 
respect of services trade, the critique concludes: 
To adopt a contract law language, the entire U.S.-JO [United States-Jordan] FTA was a 
contract of adhesion or an unconscionable contract, which was submitted by the United 
States as a fait accompli.  Trade negotiations require political will and administrative 
efforts and skills, which are finite resources for Jordan.  The U.S.-JO FTA was negotiated 
with a major power that obviously had its own objectives, while Jordan played the role of 
“demandeur.”  Jordan must be a “rule-maker,” rather than a “rule-taker.” 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 95. See MURPHY, supra note 91, at 380–381. 
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States could no more favor Israeli over Moroccan orange growers than it could 
favor in its domestic commercial regime Florida over Texas orange producers.  
Thus, there would be horizontal equality within any one FTA and across all 
FTAs. 
C. “Dignity” and Respect for the Excellent 
Finally, what criterion may be teased out of “dignity”?  In the concept of 
“equal human dignity,” a great deal of substance import is connoted by the 
word “dignity.”  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines this word 
as: 
1. The quality of being worthy or honourable; true worth, excellence. . . .  2. 
Honourable or high estate; degree of estimation, rank.96 
This lexicographic source continues on with an example of “stand on one’s 
dignity,” which means “insist on respectful treatment.”97 
The italicized words suggest that crafting the substance of international 
trade laws, such as FTA rules, ought to be a quest for the best of treatment of 
individual natural persons.  The rights of humans ought not to be undermined 
but rather elevated to the highest of the levels extant in any of the countries in 
the FTA.  The status quo on human rights, and, by extension, labor and 
environmental rights, should not be worsened; nor is a standstill acceptable 
(unless it already is at the most excellent level).  Rather, the status quo must be 
advanced toward the highest level that exists among the FTA countries.  Better 
yet, perhaps, the pursuit of world-class levels is (or ought to be) the aim.  
Significantly, “dignity” extends to treatment—especially the process of 
negotiating—an FTA with another or other countries.  Domination and 
intimidation are fundamentally at variance with respectful treatment. 
In brief, the criterion to implement “dignity” is respectful treatment that 
inclines toward the excellent.98  Three obvious substantive areas in which such 
treatment can be shown, in addition to the stylistic demeanor of trade 
 
 96. THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. I at 671 (1993) (entry for 
“dignity”) (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. An interesting inquiry (beyond the present scope) might be to explore the Aristotelian 
theory of excellence, as to its possible relevance in shaping the meaning of “dignity.” The 
Ancient Greek word “arête” is translated into “excellence” (especially recently) or “virtue” 
(frequently in the 20th century and before).  “Excellence” has fewer religious overtones than 
“virtue.” (It was Saint Thomas Aquinas who used the translation “virtue” and infused Christian 
concepts into that term.) The key point is Aristotle’s definition of the “highest good” (summum 
bonum) is “activity of soul and actions accompanied by reason . . . in accordance with excellence 
[arête] . . . in a complete life.” ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS—TRANSLATION, 
INTRODUCTION, AND COMMENTARY ch. 7, 1098a14–1098a19 (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford 
University Press 2002).  Put simply, this definition of the “highest good,” in which excellence is 
central, is equivalent to a well-lived life (eudaimonia). 
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negotiators toward one another, are human, labor and environmental rights.  
The question is what would be the best, the most excellent, levels of treatment 
encouraged or required by an FTA in each of these areas?  That question is 
treated below. 
V.  IMPLEMENTING THE LEGALISTIC CRITERIA IN FTAS 
A. Three Methods for Identifying the Excellent 
Beginning with the presumption that the substantive areas for “dignity” 
relevant to FTAs are human, labor and environmental rights, there are at least 
three ways to identify excellence worthy of respect: (1) absolutely and 
internationally; (2) regionally; or (3) pragmatically by reference to individual 
FTA members.  Using the first method, an absolute level of excellence is 
defined, and FTA members are called upon to measure up to that level.  The 
benchmark is international; i.e., what has the world community agreed on as 
being universally applicable?  This approach is a rigorous one, inquiring into 
what is excellent for all in a pure sense.  The United Nations is the obvious 
promulgating institution to look at. 
The second method is regional.  The focus is on the human, labor and 
environmental rights established by and for the region encompassing the FTA.  
For example, for NAFTA, the region would be North America, so the 
American Convention on Human Rights (under the auspices of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), a regional agency) would set the 
relevant benchmark.99  Under the third method, the existing practices of the 
members are examined, and the best of those practices are adopted for all the 
members (a kind of MFN treatment on an FTA level).  The third approach is 
practical.  It demands at least an improvement among the FTA countries to the 
level that is the best among any one of them. 
Perhaps, in some FTA contexts, the three approaches might yield the same 
result.  That is because one of the FTA members might adhere to an absolute 
level, which becomes the benchmark for all the countries in the FTA.  
Alternatively, depending on the human, labor or environmental right in 
question, it could be equally well-articulated and protected in an international, 
regional and national document. 
The regional approach raises two immediate concerns.  First, the countries 
in an FTA may not be part of the same region.  The FTA between the United 
States and Bahrain is an example.  Which region, North America or the Gulf, 
should set the benchmark on human, environmental and labor rights, and what 
criteria should govern the choice of region?  Second, what if the same country 
 
 99. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 (entered 
into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970). 
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is a party to multiple FTAs in different regions?  The United States has FTAs 
with countries in North America (Canada and Mexico, through NAFTA), 
Central America (the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), to 
which Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua, plus the 
Dominican Republic, are parties), South America (Chile), the Middle East 
(Bahrain, Jordan, Israel, Morocco and Oman) and East Asia (Singapore).  
Would different regional standards, depending on the FTA region, for equal 
human dignity be tolerable, both conceptually and practically speaking? 
Likewise, the pragmatic individual approach raises some threshold 
concerns.  No single country should foist as “best” its human, labor or 
environmental standards on the other FTA member (or members).  There must 
be a reasonably objective way to choose the best between or among the FTA 
members.  A fixed menu should not be imposed.  Rather, the top-quality items 
should be selected from a cafeteria.  While the absolute, universal approach 
likely suffers from concerns, too, its generic appeal commends it as the initial 
methodology. 
B. A Starting Point on “Dignity”? 
Accordingly, as an initial approach, what might be the most excellent 
treatment, worthy of respect to promote dignity, following the first approach?  
In respect of human rights, one possibility would be for every FTA to mandate 
full adherence to the leading international human rights agreements.100 The 
obvious top candidates in that category would be as follows:101 
 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution that is the foundational document in 
international law on human rights, and the basis for subsequent agreements 
(including the 1966 Covenants listed below).102  The Declaration 
proclaims all people are born free and equal (Article 1).  It contains a long 
list of rights and freedoms, many of which now are beyond aspirations and 
are part of customary international law.  Among the rights proclaimed, are 
to: life, liberty, and security of person (Article 3); equal recognition by and 
protection of the law (Article 7); effective legal remedies (Article 8); a fair, 
 
 100. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 25 (5th ed. 1998) 
(1966); VALERIE EPPS, INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 8 (3d ed. 2005).  The discussion of human 
rights agreements draws from Professor Epps’ textbook, particularly pp. 281–285, 292–300, 310–
312, 317–319, and Professor Brownlie’s treatise, particularly pp. 576–581.  For further 
background, see STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 9.02–
9.03 (LexisNexis 2006).  See generally JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (Hart Publishing 2007) (concerning the trade-human rights link). 
 101. All of the listed documents are reproduced in a variety of sources.  See, e.g., BASIC 
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Ian Brownlie ed., Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1992) (1971). 
 102. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 183d plen. mtg. (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal (Article 11); the 
presumption of innocence (Article 11(1)); move freely within a country 
and to leave a country (Article 13(1)-(2)); a nationality (Article 15); own 
property and not be deprived arbitrarily of it (Article 17(1)-(2)); take part 
in the government of one’s country through freely chosen representatives 
(Article 21(1)); equal access to public service (Article 21(2)); universal 
and equal suffrage and a secret ballot (Article 21((2))); social security 
(Article 21(3)); work and choose freely employment, and just and 
favorable working conditions (Article 23(1)-(3)); join trade unions (Article 
23(4)); rest and leisure (Article 24); an adequate standard of living, 
including food, clothing, housing, medical care and security upon 
unemployment, disability, or old age (Article 25); special care for mothers 
and children (Article 25(2)); education, including free, compulsory 
primary education and equally accessible, merit-based professional and 
technical education (Article 26(1)), where education is directed at the full 
development of the human person and advances human rights (Article 
26(2)), and the choice of education rests with parents (Article 26(3)); 
participate freely in the cultural life of the community (Article 27(1)); and, 
social and international order (Article 28).  Among the freedoms listed in 
the Declaration are: freedom from discrimination (Article 2), slavery or 
servitude (Article 4), torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 5), arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9), and 
interference with privacy, family or home (Article 12); freedom to marry 
when of full age and found a family with free, full consent (Article 16); 
and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18), opinion, and 
expression (Article 19), and peaceful assembly (Article 20).103 
 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
entered into force in 1976.104  This Covenant identifies specific “first-
generation” rights and freedoms (so-called because they were the first ones 
to obtain widespread recognition).105  Most of these rights and freedoms 
are grounded in the Charter and indeed expressly reiterate many of them.  
Notably, the Charter proclaims the equal right of women and men to enjoy 
civil and political rights (Article 3).  Accordingly, the Covenant covers the 
right to life (Article 6), liberty and security of person (Article 9), due 
process (Articles 9 and 14-15), equality before the law (Article 14), 
movement (Article 12), thought, conscience and religion (Article 18), 
 
 103. Id.   The Resolution passed with forty-eight votes in favor, zero against and eight 
abstentions.  For purposes of America’s FTA policy in the Middle East, it is worth noting the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia abstained.  (The other seven abstentions were the former countries of 
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia, plus Poland, South Africa and Ukraine).  
See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 912, U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/a-pv183.pdf. 
 104. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
 105. EPPS, supra note 100, at 282–283. 
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peaceful assembly (Article 21), association (Article 22), marriage and 
family (Article 23(2)), and voting (Article 25(b)).  It also proclaims 
freedom from torture (Article 7) and slavery (Article 8), and calls for 
special protections for children (Article 24).  With very limited exceptions, 
and then only during a public emergency threatening the life of a nation, 
where notice is given to the Secretary-General, no derogation is permitted 
from these rights and freedoms.  Moreover, adherence to them must be on 
an entirely non-discriminatory basis, meaning birth, color, language, 
national or social origin, political (or other) opinion, property, race, 
religion, sex, or other status are immaterial. 
 The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, which also entered into force in 1976.106  In this Covenant, which 
also draws heavily for its rights and freedoms list on the 1948 Universal 
Declaration, countries recognize (inter alia) so-called “second-generation” 
human rights (because they followed recognition of civil and political 
rights).107  Thus, the Covenant protects the right of each person to: self-
determination, political status and the free pursuit of economic, social and 
cultural development (Article 1(1)); freely dispose of natural wealth and 
resources (Article 1(2)); to work, including technical and vocational 
guidance and training programs (Article 6); just, favorable, safe and 
healthy working conditions, equal opportunity, promotion, rest and leisure, 
and an adequate standard of living for oneself and one’s family (Article 7); 
form trade unions and strike (Article 8(1)); social security (Article 9); a 
family as the natural, fundamental group unit of society (Article 10(1)); 
special protections for mothers before and after childbirth, and working 
mothers (Article 10(2)); special protections for children, including a 
minimum working age (Article 10(3)); an adequate standard of living, 
including food, clothing, and housing, and to be free from hunger, in part 
through an obligation on the state to ensure it improves its methods to 
produce, conserve, and distribute food (Article 11(1)-(2)); enjoy the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including the 
reduction of infant mortality through an obligation on the state to improve 
environmental and industrial hygiene (Article 12); education, including 
compulsory, free primary education (Article 13(1)-(2)); take part in 
cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress (Article 15(1)).  
 
 106. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force on 3 January 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). 
  Traditionally, developed countries tend to lend strong support to the ideas embodied in 
the ICCPR, whereas developing and newly industrialized countries championed the principles of 
the ICESR.  The debate over the two Covenants exposed deep schisms between western 
governments (which generally argued civil and political rights are foundational for economic and 
social liberties) and non-western governments (which said the reverse sequence was logical and 
inevitable). 
 107. See generally EPPS, supra note 100 (additionally stating that group rights, like the right 
to development and self-determination, are third generation). 
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The Covenant (Article 2(1)) declares these rights and freedoms must be 
provided on a non-discriminatory basis (with the exception in Article 2(2) 
for developing countries that they may decide the extent to which they can 
guarantee economic rights to non-nationals). 
In effect, an FTA in which the United States is engaged would incorporate by 
reference these human right conventions. 
Preposterous as this legal maneuver might sound, two observations should 
be made.  First, there is considerable consistency, and even indeed overlap, 
between the religious and international legal principles at stake.  That is 
evident from even a cursory comparison of the ten fundamental rights needed 
to support human dignity Pope John XXIII identifies in Pacem in Terris with 
the itemized rights and freedoms in the conventions.  In other words, religious 
faith and legal reason can and do support one another in insisting on respect for 
human rights, and they mutually provoke the question: What can an FTA do to 
enhance this respect? 
Second, the EU has exercised a mild form of it.  In its new Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) Plus scheme, the EU encourages beneficiary 
countries to implement and enforce a variety of human rights conventions, if 
they seek enhanced trade benefits.  To be sure, whether the precise technical 
arrangements comply with the 2004 WTO Appellate Body decision in 
European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries is open to debate.108  Moreover, the EU may move to a 
different system in 2009 when it revamps its preferences scheme.  Nonetheless, 
that a major trading power, whatever its motives might be, has seen fit to tying 
human rights directly to trade is a significant example for the United States. 
Suppose the United States followed suit, putting human rights criteria in its 
FTAs.  It could then further “piggy back” on institutional mechanisms 
established in the relevant human rights conventions.  That is, in the event of a 
dispute about human rights under the FTA, the FTA itself could require 
recourse to an adjudicatory, arbitral or investigative body relevant to the 
accord at issue, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (HR Committee) (under Article 41 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or the United Nations 
 
 108. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) (adopted Apr. 20, 
2004).  For a discussion of this case and the subsequent changes the EC made to its GSP program, 
see Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 869, 
869–886 (2007).  See also Elena Fierro, Legal Basis and Scope of the Human Rights Clauses in 
EC Bilateral Agreements: Any Room for Positive Interpretation?, 7 EUR. L. J. 41 (2001).  For 
treatments of the linkages forged by the EU between trade policy and human rights, see, for 
example, Peter Hilpold, Human Rights and WTO Law: From Conflict to Coordination, 45 
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 484 (2007). 
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Human Commission (HR Commission).109  If the accord does not create the 
mechanism, or if a party to the FTA does not consent to the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ or submit to the HR Commission, then the FTA could provide the 
necessary gap-filling institution.  For instance, the FTA could establish a 
standing FTA “Human Rights Council,” consisting of qualified individuals 
from the member countries. 
An interesting question is whether America’s FTAs ought also to 
incorporate the leading United Nations Conventions on specific human rights 
topics.  These accords include: 
 The 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 
 The 1951 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of 
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. 
 The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 
Protocol). 
 The 1957 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions Similar to Slavery. 
 The 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. 
 The 1976 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid. 
 The 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. 
 The 1987 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
 The 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child.110 
At least under the absolute, universal approach, whether the United States is a 
party to the document should not matter.  (Along with Sudan, it is not, for 
example, a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.)  The human 
rights these documents embody establish what is worthy of respect as 
excellent. 
 
 109. Part IV of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes the HR Committee.  A 
distinct body, the HR Commission, is a subsidiary of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and is authorized via Article 19 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.  The HR Commission studies and reports on gross violations of human rights.  
See EPPS, supra note 100, at 283–284, 292–294. 
 110. These accords, including their basic legal citation and enforcement mechanism, are set 
out in EPPS, supra note 100, at 297–298 (listing the years the provisions were entered into force). 
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On labor rights, an FTA seeking dignified treatment of labor could look for 
inspiration to two international sources.  First, the 1948 Charter for an 
International Trade Organization (ITO), i.e., the Havana Charter, while never 
implemented, expressed concern about employment, wages and fair labor 
practices.  Indeed, this concern was evident at the outset of the document, 
especially in Articles Two and Seven: 
ARTICLE 2. 
IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION AND DEMAND IN RELATION TO 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHARTER 
1. The Members recognize that the avoidance of unemployment or 
underemployment, through the achievement and maintenance in each 
country of useful employment opportunities for those able and willing to 
work and of a large and steadily growing volume of production and 
effective demand for goods and services, is not of domestic concern alone, 
but is also a necessary condition for the achievement of the general 
purpose and the objectives set forth in Article 1, including the expansion of 
international trade, and thus for the well-being of all other countries. 
2. The Members recognize that, while the avoidance of unemployment or 
underemployment must depend primarily on internal measures taken by 
individual countries, such measures should be supplemented by concerted 
action under the sponsorship of the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations [ECOSOC] in collaboration with the appropriate inter-
governmental organizations, each of these bodies acting within its 
respective sphere and consistently with the terms and purposes of its basic 
instrument. 
3. The Members recognize that the regular exchange of information and 
views among Members is indispensable for successful co-operation in the 
field of employment and economic activity and should be facilitated by the 
Organization. 
  . . . . 
ARTICLE 7. 
FAIR LABOUR STANDARDS 
1. The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take 
fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental 
declarations, conventions and agreements.  They recognize that all 
countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of 
fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement 
of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit.  The 
Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in 
production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, 
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accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate 
and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory. 
2. Members which are also members of the International Labour Organisation 
[ILO] shall co-operate with that organization in giving effect to this 
undertaking. 
3. In all matters relating to labour standards that may be referred to the 
Organization in accordance with the provisions of Articles 94 or 95, it 
shall consult and co-operate with the International Labour Organisation.111 
This language is redolent of expressions from some human rights documents 
that mention the right to work and adequate working conditions.  That is not 
surprising, as basic labor rights are (or seem to be accepted as) human rights 
and worthy of respect by all employers in all countries.112  Notably, however, 
because the rights to employment and decent employment conditions are 
fundamental, it may not be accurate to call them the most excellent standards.  
They are minimum floors, and thus respect for them, without more, probably 
would neither improve the status quo in some contexts nor comport generally 
with a vigorous interpretation to the word “dignity.” 
Thus, turning to a second source to which an equal human dignity-oriented 
FTA might look is necessary.  That source is suggested by the ITO Charter, 
namely, the ILO.  Created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and based in 
Geneva, Switzerland, the ILO boasts membership by over 150 countries.  
Some of the ILO standards replicate particular human rights articulated in the 
Universal Declaration or one of the Covenants.  It sponsors a number of 
conventions.  The leading ones embodying core labor rights are: 
 The freedom of association.113 
 The right to organize and bargain collectively.114 
 The freedom from forced or compulsory labor.115 
 
 111. See BHALA, supra note 65, at 7–10. 
 112. See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: 
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1 (2007) (concerning the 
dignified treatment of labor). 
 113. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, ILO Convention No. 87 (June 17, 1948), compiled in 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919–1951 vol. 1, 527 (ILO 
1996). 
 114. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention concerning The Application of the Principles of 
the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, ILO Convention No. 98 (June 8, 1949), 
compiled in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919–1951 vol. 
1, 639 (ILO 1996). 
 115. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour, ILO 
Convention No. 105 (June 5, 1957), compiled in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919–1995 vol. 2, 88 (ILO 1996). 
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 A minimum age for the employment of children.116 
 Measures that set forth minimum standards for work conditions.117 
Here again, the criticism may be entertained that adherence to the ILO core 
labor standards evinces respect for workers, but not at the most excellent level.  
However, the criticism this time is less persuasive.  The core standards, along 
with the right to work and good working conditions from the ITO Charter and 
human rights law form a package of best practices.  It is evident that these 
practices are not followed in many countries, rich and poor alike.  Imagine a 
world in which they were, and the sense of excellence of the package becomes 
apparent.  (That same thought experiment helps justify many of the human 
rights obligations, which, but for the fact they are not respected universally, 
seem stunningly obvious as setting minimums.) 
Finally, in respect of environmental rights, some are redolent of specific 
human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration or one of the 
Covenants.118  Therefore, one possibility, akin to the methodology intimated on 
labor rights, would be to itemize the rights emanating from human rights law 
and trace their development into the world’s leading international and 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  Theoretically, that would 
mean countries seeking to form an FTA accept environmental rights—
specifically, the right of each individual to a clean, healthy environment—as a 
third-generation human right, following the first-generation civil and political 
human rights, and the second-generation economic and social rights. 
Practically speaking, an FTA could focus on MEAs that directly affect the 
lives of humans in countries proposing to form an FTA.  That is because, as the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment provides, 
environmental protection is for the benefit of mankind.119 If equal human 
dignity is the lodestar of an FTA, then no trade liberalization between or 
among countries should cause degradation in the cleanliness of the air or water 
consumed by humans living in the FTA countries.  Rather, the FTA should 
help enhance air, land and water quality, as it ought to bolster human and labor 
rights.  Accordingly, international environmental agreements addressing 
 
 116. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment, ILO Convention No. 138 (June 6, 1973), compiled in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919–1995 vol. 2, 525 (ILO 1996); Int’l Labour Org. 
[ILO], Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, ILO Convention No. 182 (June 17, 1999), available at 
http://www.ilo.org. 
 117. A variety of ILO conventions embody this core labor right. 
 118. See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS ch. 12 (2d ed. 
2006) (regarding information on international environmental law); MURPHY, supra note 91, at ch. 
12 (regarding information on international environmental law). 
 119. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416. 
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atmospheric, land-based and water pollution may be appropriate to consider.120 
Additionally, MEAs that address acute or chronic human public health 
problems, such as the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), could factor into FTAs.121 After all, an FTA that eliminates tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade in cigarettes hardly comports with respect for good, 
much less first-rate, human health. 
That is not to say the exclusive focus of countries in an FTA should be on 
anthropocentric rights.  Inspired by the 1982 World Charter for Nature122 and 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,123 countries 
would be free (even encouraged) to synthesize those rights with provisions that 
protect nature for its own sake, preserve animal and plant species, and employ 
sustainable development practices.  Thus, adherence to the 1973 Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), which concerns poaching endangered animals and harvesting rare 
plants, could be required by the FTA.124  Further examples would be the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (or a suitable 
successor accord).125 
Regarding both environmental and labor rights, considerable attention 
must be paid to enforcement mechanisms.  The solution outlined for human 
rights—that an FTA establish a dispute resolution mechanism if an 
international text incorporated into the FTA by reference lacks one—would 
mean plenty of gap-filling will be needed because the ILO conventions contain 
little in the way of stringent enforcement.  Similarly, enforcement mechanisms 
in MEAs tend to be weak, inchoate (taking the form of notification, 
 
 120. See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 
T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 (regarding European and North American countries 
regulating of sulfur dioxide and other long-range pollutants); Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 
3 (requiring the progressive reduction by target dates of the production and consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons, because they deplete the ozone); Basle Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 
1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–5 (1991), 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (concerning the transport and disposal 
of hazardous materials across borders); U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103–39 (1994), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (concerning protection of the marine 
environment).  For an overview of these and other international environmental accords, see 
MURPHY, supra note 91, at 372. 
 121. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 518. 
 122. See World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982). 
 123. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874. 
 124. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 125. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 818; Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 
1997, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22. 
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consultation and black-listing) and hotly debated.  Aside from the exact nature 
of the institutional apparatus an FTA creates, a key topic will be the 
appropriate triggers and types of punishment for violations.  Are trade 
sanctions appropriate, as in WTO dispute settlement, or should monetary fines 
be used, as the NAFTA Environmental and Labor Side Agreements envision?  
Following the traditional public international law doctrine of state 
responsibility, would liability fall only on sovereign governments, or could 
individuals and their firms be punished? 
VI.  EQUAL HUMAN DIGNITY AND NEGOTIATING STYLE 
In international trade law, style sometimes matters as much as substance.  
The style with which an FTA is negotiated and implemented is susceptible to 
an equal human dignity analysis.  Indeed, on negotiating style, “dignity” can be 
interpreted quite concretely by returning to Kant’s Categorical Imperative.  
Would the tactics and tone employed by a country such as the United States be 
ones the American side agreed ought to be universal?  Among the suspect 
practices, all of which by anecdotal evidence are or have been used by the 
United States in the midst FTA negotiations, include: 
 Presenting an FTA as a fait accompli, in a “take-it-or-leave-it” manner. 
 Declaring “here is the agreement, I would like your answer, preferably in 
fifteen minutes.” 
 Playing one country (e.g., Panama or Qatar) off against another country 
(e.g., Colombia or Oman). 
None of these tactics would pass muster under the Categorical Imperative, 
much less a sound book on negotiations such as Getting to Yes.126 Rather, they 
conjure up images of the Ancient Greek Melian Dialogue—that the strong will 
do what they do, and the weak will suffer what they must—in practice. 
In terms of the legalistic equal human dignity criteria, each practice (and 
many akin to them) is offensive.  First, “humans” are not treated neutrally.  
Rather, they are separated into the powerful versus the weak.  With powerful 
negotiating counterparties, these tactics and tone are unacceptable and 
unworkable.  The United States, for instance, will not tolerate them from 
Colombia, Oman, Panama or Qatar.  But the United States can get away with it 
vis-à-vis such countries (or so it may believe).  Second, these tactics and tone 
undermine equality, in that certain groups of humans are discriminated against.  
Strong humans, i.e., trade negotiators from powerful (typically wealthy) 
countries, do not suffer these practices.  Weak humans, i.e., trade diplomats 
and lawyers from weak (typically poor) countries, have little choice but to put 
up with the mischief.  In effect, MFN treatment is not accorded in terms of 
 
 126. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 141–42 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin 2d ed. 1991) (1981). 
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negotiating decency.  Third, none of these practices is respectful, nor does any 
represent the best, or most excellent, of treatment that one human (e.g., an 
American official) is capable of extending to another human (e.g., a foreign 
government official).127 
Certain post-negotiation practices also are dubious in terms of having any 
claim to universality.  For example, a deal, when signed, ought to be a deal.  
Unless further negotiations are built into an agreement in writing, the 
agreement itself, once signed, ought to be implemented with all deliberate 
speed and meaning immediacy, not self-interested foot-dragging (as, of course, 
occurred in the aftermath of the famous 1955 school desegregation 
implementation case, Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), in which the 
United States Supreme Court penned the phrase “with all deliberate speed”).128 
These principles embody respect for the party with which the agreement is 
signed and should apply neutrally (i.e., to all parties with whom a deal is 
signed), and in a non-discriminatory way (regardless of whether the party may 
be put into one or another category, like rich or poor, or Arab or Israeli).  
Holding up implementation by presenting new issues undermines the trust and 
confidence one side places in another that they can rely, with certainty and 
predictability, on the terms they just concluded.  Yet American behavior 
toward Oman exemplified these very incongruities. 
The United States and Oman signed an FTA on January 19, 2006.129 The 
House and Senate approved the accord in July and September, respectively, of 
the same year.  The deal fit into America’s plans for a MEFTA, being the fifth 
FTA in the Middle East following deals with Israel, Jordan, Morocco and 
Bahrain.130 Two years later, as of January 2008, the President still had not 
issued a proclamation to put the Oman FTA into force.  All other MEFTA 
building blocks—the FTAs with Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain—had 
taken effect relatively swiftly after congressional passage.  Why was Oman 
treated unequally? 
 
 127. Lest the rebuttal be offered that foreign officials occasionally treat American officials 
badly in trade negotiations, from an equal human dignity perspective the answer is obvious: 
receipt of ill treatment in practice is no excuse for running afoul of a Categorical Imperative.  
That is, if decent conduct in negotiations is accepted as a behavior to generalize, then the episodic 
incivility does not undermine this understanding.  Rather, the departure only shows the need for 
renewed efforts at good behavior, not for a departure into puerile tit-for-tat behavior. 
 128. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  Possibilities of unscrupulous behavior 
in the negotiations (e.g., one side lying to another), or egregious supervening events (e.g., war or 
terrorism), are discounted here. 
 129. See U.S. Free Trade Pact with Oman Expected to Enter Into Force Shortly, 25 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 60 (Jan. 10, 2008). 
 130. The legal, political and economic aspects of America’s FTAs are analyzed in a series of 
tables in RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW Annex B (LexisNexis 
2008). 
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The reason was that after the FTA was signed, American trade officials 
handed Omani authorities a twenty-four page list of issues that the Omanis 
would have to address to the satisfaction of the Americans before the FTA 
could take effect.  After about two years, the Omanis had worked through 
twenty-three pages and were seeking to satisfy the Americans on a final page 
of topics.  Manifestly, the deal the Omanis thought they had in January 2006 
did not exist.  Would the American side have accepted this treatment from a 
prospective FTA partner?  To ask the question is to reveal the answer. 
Regrettably, there are three additional examples in which the United States 
has engaged in post-negotiation tactics that are dubious in terms of dignified 
and equal treatment of people (both trade officials and private citizens 
potentially affected by a trade liberalization agreement) in other countries.  On 
June 30, 2007, the United States and Korea signed an FTA (KORUS).  On 
June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama signed an FTA, and on 
November 22, 2006, the United States and Colombia signed an FTA.  In all 
three instances, following the signature, one or another constituency in the 
American government objected to the bargain and intentionally stalled 
congressional consideration of implementing legislation.131 
In respect of KORUS, Max Baucus, a Democrat from Montana and the 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, indicated repeatedly his 
opposition to KORUS unless and until the Korean government lifts sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures that restrict American beef imports.  
KORUS does not resolve all the beef SPS measures, perhaps partly because of 
the severe time pressure under which negotiators operated.  They completed 
the actual deal on March 31 and April 1, 2007, minutes before they had to 
notify Congress of their intent to submit one under fast-track Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) under the Trade Act of 2002.132 That pressure aside, is the 
failure to address one issue fully an appropriate justification for Congress to 
hold up congressional passage of a deal Korea thought it had cinched and had 
the signatures to prove it? 
As for the Panama FTA, a number of American legislators have indicated 
that implementation is impossible unless and until Panama addresses an 
individual legal case. The Speaker of its National Assembly (i.e., the 
 
 131. See Hill Watch, Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 460, 462 (Mar. 27, 2008) (tabular 
entries for “Colombia, Panama FTAs” and “Korea FTA”). 
 132. See BHALA, supra note 65, at 687. 
  The 2002 Trade Act amends the Trade Act of 1974 and various other American trade 
statutes in title 19 of the United States Code.  Basic trade negotiating authority initially was set 
out in the Trade Act of 1974, Subchapter I (entitled “Negotiation and Other Authority”), as 
amended, particularly 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111–2213 (2000), and these provisions generally remain 
relevant.  The TPA provisions constitute the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 
codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813  (Supp. V 2000), and supplement and amplify the basic 
authority. 
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Panamanian parliament), Pedro Miguel González-Pinzon, a member of the 
ruling PRD party, has been indicted in a United States federal court for 
allegedly murdering an American soldier, United States Army Corporal Zak 
Hernandez, near Panama City in 1992.133 Mr. González took office in 
September 2007, long after the FTA negotiations commenced in 2004, and the 
FTA was signed on June 28, 2007.  His term as Speaker was scheduled to 
expire on September 1, 2008. 
Though acquitted of the charge by a jury in Panama, Mr. González offered 
to resign so as not to be an impediment to the FTA.  He also intoned: “The era 
in which the U.S. had last word in determining who governed our nation and 
how they did so is over.”134  In March 2008, he declared he would serve out his 
term but not seek re-election.135 Not persuaded, the United States insisted it 
would not consider the FTA for implementation until the Speaker left office 
and faced its judicial process.  Vociferous opposition in the United States came 
from Congress, including Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy 
Pelosi (Democrat-California), and Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York).136 Officials 
of the administration of President George W. Bush, such as Carlos M. 
Gutierrez, the Secretary of Commerce, met with Panamanian government 
officials and told them the matter was a problem but did not set out specifically 
what Panama needs to do to get the FTA unstuck.137 
Thus, an arrest warrant for him remains outstanding in the United States.  
Serious as that charge is and tragic as the passing of Sergeant Hernandez is, the 
case is not even remotely connected with cross-border trade in goods and 
services.  As Panama’s Minister of Transport, Balbina Herrera, explained: 
What happened with thousands of Panamanians [during the 1989 U.S. invasion 
of Panama] also hurt us, so don’t open up old wounds. 
There are much more important things than just an economic issue.  For us, the 
relationship with the US is not an economic one.  It is an issue of respect.138 
Put simply, query whether the American post-negotiation tactic is old-
fashioned bullying of one country by a larger one to get a result the latter seeks 
on an unrelated issue, a tactic at variance with fidelity to equal human dignity. 
The Colombia FTA presents another instance of dubious post-negotiation 
behavior, although the issue on which the United States seeks progress is 
 
 133. See Adam Thomson, U.S. Angered as Panama Elects Wanted Man, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4 
2007, at 2. 
 134. Id. (quoting González). 
 135. See Panamanian Lawmaker Stalling Approval of U.S. Free Trade Pact Plans to Step 
Down, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 527 (Apr. 10, 2008). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. (quoting Secretary Gutierrez). 
 138. See Thomson, supra note 133, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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consistent with the indirect effects of trade on equal human dignity under a 
religious approach (discussed in Section III.C, supra).  The hideous violence 
against trade unionists in Colombia is an appropriate concern of American 
trade officials, and labor rights were addressed in the FTA talks.  Some 
congressional leaders, such as House Speaker Pelosi are dissatisfied with the 
outcome and have demanded that Colombia redouble its efforts to protect trade 
unionists.  An enhanced trade adjustment assistance (TAA) package also is a 
pre-condition to passing the Colombia FTA (and other such accords). 
To be fair, given its constitutional authority to regulate foreign trade, 
Congress is legally entitled to object to a trade agreement on the merits or to 
link passage of a trade deal to forward progress on other issues, be they trade-
related or not.  Even under the delegation of this authority to the President and 
the concomitant use of fast-track procedures under TPA, which apply to 
KORUS and the Panama and Colombia FTAs, Congress can reject a deal on an 
up-or-down vote if it finds the deal fails to resolve an important issue.139 In 
other words, the point of these illustrations is not to question the existence of 
congressional power. 
Rather, the key question concerns the wise exercise of that power.  If a 
matter is of great importance to legislators, then the earlier it is brought to the 
attention of trade negotiators, and the more assiduous they are about 
implementing the will of Congress in their negotiations, the better.  There is 
ample statutory authority for Congresspersons and Senators to provide 
guidance and feedback.  Indeed, members of the House of Representatives and 
Senate can and do serve as congressional advisers to the Executive Branch on 
trade negotiations, policy and implementation,140 and the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) is legally obligated to accredit members of the 
Congressional Oversight Group as official advisers to a United States 
delegation engaged in trade negotiations.141 If dignified treatment of other 
people matters, then exercising this authority on a critical matter—particularly 
one that, to America’s trading partners, may be unconnected or only loosely 
connected with an FTA—is necessary.  The people with whom the United 
States negotiates FTAs then will not be surprised, following the inking of a 
deal, by what they perceive as new, higher or different demands.  Bluntly 
stated, appropriate consultation before and during FTA talks will preempt an 
accusation from abroad that the United States engages in blackmail.  Surely, 
American trade officials would prefer no less certainty, predictability and 
decency from foreign negotiators. 
 
 139. The prohibition on amendments in the House of Representatives or Senate to 
implementing bills is set out in the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (2000). 
 140. See 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (2000) (mandating congressional involvement). 
 141. See 19 U.S.C. § 3807(a)(4) (Supp. V 2000) (concerning accreditation). 
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VII.  QUESTIONS YET UNANSWERED 
Admittedly, the present discussion is at best exploratory and tentative.  An 
equal human dignity paradigm for international trade law generally, and FTAs 
particularly, would raise as many questions as it might resolve. 
First, the list of human, labor and environmental accords potentially 
relevant to incorporation explicitly or by reference in an FTA is rather 
daunting.  At what point might an FTA become bogged down with human 
rights obligations because of rigid insistence on comprehensiveness in 
following the “dignity” criterion of respect for excellence?  Under a changed 
paradigm, the FTA is supposed to insist on the primacy of equal human dignity 
over efficiency.  But, the new paradigm does not posit an invariable trade-off 
between the two concepts, and thus is not merely an umbrella document for 
human, labor and environmental rights.  Rather, the FTA is supposed to say 
something about liberalizing trade, finance and investment flows to advance 
equal human dignity.  Might it be prudent to trim the list of accords and focus 
on particular obligations that matter most—say, for example, freedom of 
conscience in respect of human rights, core labor rights and clean water and 
breathable air as regards environmental rights? 
A second concern, following from the first one, is legal capacity.142 An 
FTA created in the crucible of equal human dignity could have little practical 
effect, at least in the short term, if one or more of the parties lack the ability to 
implement and enforce the human, labor and environmental rights mandated 
by the accord.  That difficulty is especially foreseeable with some developing, 
and essentially all least developed, countries that might be partners in an FTA 
with the United States.  It would not be satisfactory, in the long run, to “dumb 
down” the equal human dignity criteria in an FTA to accommodate poor legal 
capacity.  The result almost certainly would be no advancement in the status 
quo on human, labor or environmental rights.  Rather, it would seem preferable 
to encourage movement on an upward trajectory by helping FTA parties 
realize the most excellent of treatment, on a neutral and non-discriminatory 
basis.  To do so will require help; put bluntly, money and brains. 
 
 142. For example, the Apostolic Nuncio of the Holy See to the United Nations states: 
[N]ot all States have the technical capacity to cope with all their international obligations.  
There is a growing gap between the development of international law and the capacity of 
individual States to incorporate it into national legislation and implement it. 
Thus, technical assistance to these countries is of the utmost importance if observance of 
international treaties is to be had. 
Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Nuncio and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the 
United Nations, Address at the 62nd Session of the General Assembly, before the Sixth 
Committee on Item 86–The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (Oct. 26, 2007), 
in L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Jan. 16, 2008, at 10 (English translation). 
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The question, then, is to what extent should an FTA premised on equal 
human dignity also contain provisions for technical assistance by the United 
States to ensure proper execution?  Possibly, a developed country (or 
countries) in an FTA can be the primary obligor in respect of helping less 
fortunate partners satisfy the equal human dignity criteria in the FTA.  Yet, 
pursuing this approach opens the door to special and differential treatment, 
which erodes the non-discrimination criterion associated with “equal.” There 
must be a compelling reason for overriding this criterion, such as a religiously 
based preferential option for the poor or a legal canon (found in most post-
1990 MEAs) like the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.143 
Instead, might it be appropriate for an FTA to draw for technical assistance 
explicitly on specialized inter-governmental bodies, like the ILO in respect of 
labor rights, and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and 
United Nations Sustainable Development Commission (CSD) as regards 
environmental rights? 
Third, international trade agreements conventionally are between 
sovereign states.  With limited exceptions in some FTAs, such as Chapter 
Eleven of NAFTA, they tend not to confer rights and obligations on 
individuals within those states, much less provide direct causes of action by an 
individual against the government of a state that is party to the agreement.  Yet 
the first Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights allows individuals to submit complaints against governments directly to 
the HR Committee, once they have exhausted all domestic remedies.144  Equal 
human dignity focuses attention on the individual, and how a trade agreement 
affects her is a deliberate aim of the paradigm shift.  However, would an equal 
human dignity paradigm for FTAs mean individuals can bring human, labor 
and even environmental rights claims against a government?  If so, what kind 
of liability ought to attach to such claims?  Might an offending government be 
held jointly and severally liable to an aggrieved person not only with another 
violating government, but in appropriate circumstances, with a violating 
individual or firm?  In brief, how might state and civil liability regimes be 
constructed or adjusted to ensure equal human dignity criteria in an FTA are 
enforceable? 
Fourth, trade remedies are another example where much further research 
into the implications of a paradigmatic shift would be needed.  For instance, 
how would the criteria of neutrality, non-discrimination, and respect apply in 
the context of trade remedies?  Would their application be the same for 
 
 143. See BHALA, supra note 24, at 432–38 (concerning the preferential option for the poor); 
MURPHY, supra note 91, at 381 (on the principle of intergenerational equity). 
 144. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the first optional Protocol in 1966, and it 
took effect a decade later.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383. 
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remedies against unfair trade (antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties 
(CVDs) and IP infringement) as for fair trade (safeguard actions)? 
Fifth, how do and should equal human dignity criteria relate to the 
management of trade typical in FTAs?  Typically, FTAs do not lead to 
immediate, unconditional, economy-wide free trade.  Rather, they liberalize a 
swath of trade in goods and services but phase out trade restrictions in a variety 
of sectors over many years, sometimes decades.  Does equal human dignity 
require immediacy of trade liberalization and comprehensiveness of sectors? 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The dominant paradigm in which international trade agreements, including 
FTAs, are negotiated, drafted, implemented and enforced remains an economic 
one.  For all the criticism Adam Smith’s law of absolute advantage and David 
Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage have attracted in the current era of 
globalization, those laws still drive trade law and policy in the United States 
and indeed throughout much of the world.  However, what if the prime concern 
shifted from efficiency-based economic principles and criteria to equal human 
dignity? 
Equal human dignity has a distinguished philosophical legacy, dating at 
least as far back as Immanuel Kant, namely his essay Perpetual Peace, and the 
Categorical Imperative.  Properly understood, the Imperative boasts three 
different articulations: the Formula of the Universal Law, the Formula of 
Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy. Applying the Categorical Imperative 
to FTAs would suggest, at a minimum, Golden Rule-like treatment of FTA 
partners. 
A religious perspective, such as the one offered by Catholic Social Justice 
Theory, calls attention to the ultimate source of the equal dignity of the human 
person (a common Creator) and the ultimate end to which each person is 
invited to contemplate (eternal life).  Put into practice in FTAs, this Theory 
focuses attention on the direct and indirect effects of trade liberalization on 
freedom of conscience.  Directly, does an FTA enshrine freedom of worship as 
a fundamental right of each human person and obligate each FTA member to 
respect it above all else?  Indirectly, does an FTA operate to enhance freedom 
of worship by improving the economic milieu in which this freedom may be 
more easily exercised? 
Taking a legalistic approach to tease out what the lofty concept of “equal 
human dignity” would mean for trade negotiators, lawyers and policy makers 
in practice suggests three criteria, one associated with each word of the 
concept.  “Human” would mean all trade accords apply neutrally.  “Equal” 
would mean the rules of the accords apply in a non-discriminatory fashion.  
“Dignity” would mean that the accords champion, as a first priority, respect, 
and that respect is manifest in human, labor and environmental rights. 
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The philosophical, religious and legalistic perspectives on FTAs need not 
be mutually exclusive, and their implications may be quite similar.  Of course, 
considerably more work is needed, both as to theory and practice, for there to 
be a credible and viable case for a paradigm shift in the minds of hard-headed 
economic realists. 
 
